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Kevin Shi
Modern machine learning techniques have achieved surprisingly good standard test accuracy, yet
classical machine learning theory has been unable to explain the underlying reason behind this
success. The phenomenon of adversarial examples further complicates our understanding of what
it means to have good generalization ability. Classifiers that generalize well to the test set are easily
fooled by imperceptible image modifications, which can often be computed without knowledge of
the classifier itself. The adversarial error of a classifier measures the error under which each test
data point can be modified by an algorithm before it is given as input to the classifier. Followup
work has showed that a tradeoff exists between optimizing for standard generalization error versus
for adversarial error. This calls into question whether standard generalization error is the correct
metric to measure.
We try to understand the generalization capability of modern machine learning techniques
through the lens of adversarial examples. To reconcile the apparent tradeoff between the two com-
peting notions of error, we create new security definitions and classifier constructions which allow
us to prove an upper bound on the adversarial error that decreases as standard test error decreases.
We introduce a cryptographic proof technique by defining a security assumption in a simpler attack
setting and proving a security reduction from a restricted black-box attack problem to this security
assumption. We then investigate the double descent curve in the interpolation regime, where test
error can continue to decrease even after training error has reached 0, to give a natural explanation
for the observed tradeoff between adversarial error and standard generalization error.
The second part of our work investigates further this notion of a black-box model by looking
at the separation between being able to evaluate a function and being able to actually understand
it. This is formalized through the notion of function obfuscation in cryptography. Given some
concrete implementation of a function, the implementation is considered obfuscated if a user can-
not produce the function output on a test input without querying the implementation itself. This
means that a user cannot actually learn or understand the function even though all of the imple-
mentation details are presented in the clear. As expected this is a very strong requirement that does
not exist for all functions one might be interested in. In our work we make progress on providing
obfuscation schemes for simple, explicit function classes.
The last part of our work investigates non-statistical biases and algorithms for nonconvex op-
timization problems. We show that the continuous-time limit of stochastic gradient descent does
not converge directly to the local optimum, but rather has a bias term which grows with the step
size. We also construct novel, non-statistical algorithms for two parametric learning problems by
employing lattice basis reduction techniques from cryptography.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Deep learning has achieved breakthrough success in a wide variety of domains such as image
recognition, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning for game playing. However,
despite many such examples of empirical success, we have a very limited understanding of how
deep learning achieves these results. State of the art deep neural networks with many more parame-
ters than training data points have the capacity to fit random noise perfectly, which renders classical
statistical learning theory results on generalization inapplicable to this setting. Understanding the
success of deep learning requires rethinking generalization theory [1].
The recent phenomenon of adversarial examples [2] calls into question whether standard gen-
eralization error is even the correct metric to optimize for. State of the art neural networks make
extremely brittle predictions on test data points, meaning the `p distance from a test data point to
the decision boundary towards an incorrect class can be extremely small. In the domain of image
recognition, this means that images can be modified in a way such that they are visually indistin-
guishable from the original image by humans, yet are incorrectly classified by standard models.
This is problematic from both an implementation security perspective as well as a theoretical per-
spective, because such classifiers do not seem to fit our intuition of what it means for a model to
be well-generalizing.
Current research on defenses against adversarial attacks is highly empirical, and researchers
proposing new defense techniques are asked to validate against an ever-increasing library of attack
algorithms. This makes it difficult to argue for the security of a defense against attacks that have yet
to be tested or discovered. To make matters worse, researchers have noticed that trying to secure
models against adversarial examples has the effect of decreasing standard generalization accuracy
[3], causing an apparent contradiction between two competing definitions of accuracy. This is
again problematic from both a practitioner’s perspective, because high accuracy with respect to
1
both measures is desirable, and from a theoretical perspective, because it seems unclear whether
deep learning is actually doing the right thing. Our thesis aims to address these concerns and others
by introducing new ideas from cryptography.
1.1 Thesis statement
We apply several ideas from cryptography, including proof techniques, security definitions, and
algorithms, to address problems faced in modern machine learning. We show how these techniques
can reconcile problems in adversarial machine learning, rigorously define models of information
access to classifiers, and achieve improved algorithmic results for certain learning problems. We
split our contributions into three chapters:
• We propose studying adversarial examples from the perspective of both defenses and ex-
planations as a pathway to developing a new understanding of generalization. To that end,
we develop new definitions, constructions, and proofs to achieve security guarantees in a
restricted but still practical attack setting which at the same time is not at odds with standard
generalization accuracy. We then try to explain the apparent observed tradeoff between ro-
bustness and accuracy as the fault of ill-behaved optimization algorithms in the presence of
many weak features.
• We link together the two separate notions of white-box adversarial security and black-box
adversarial security through the study of cryptographic obfuscation. We construct a provable
obfuscation scheme for a function class with some resemblance to the majority voting of an
ensemble classifier scheme.
• We investigate ideas outside of standard statistical optimization techniques to better under-
stand the algorithmic aspects of nonconvex optimization problems in machine learning. We
show quantitative non-statistical biases of stochastic gradient descent away from the global
minimum by studying solutions continuous-time stochastic differential equations. We also
propose the application of cryptanalysis algorithms such as LLL Lattice Basis reduction for
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solving nonconvex parameter recovery problems. We illustrate how this algorithm can be
used to achieve significantly better sample complexity for two variants of classical machine
learning problems.
1.2 Overview
Modern cryptographic protocols and constructions have many different complicated compo-
nents, yet we can understand their security in simpler terms. This is because cryptography has
solved this problem of empirical validation by reducing the overall security problem to a smaller
and simpler-to-state problem that can be verified independently of the original security problem.
Even though standard cryptographic assumptions such as the existence of one-way functions have
never been mathematically proven, they have stood the test of time as one-way function candidates
continue to resist empirical attacks. Cryptography makes progress by building more complicated
constructions on top of these foundational assumptions. We want to apply this key principle to the
field of adversarial machine learning.
However progress in cryptography often proceeds in the opposite direction, because we start
with the final construction that we want to show security for. The challenge is finding a crypto-
graphic assumption which is both believable and from which the final construction security can be
reduced to. It is easy to define an assumption that is too strong to empirically verify, but one which
makes the security proof trivial. Conversely, a security assumption that is too weak may not even
admit a reduction from the final security problem. Defining the correct security assumption is a
balancing act between these two extremes.
The second chapter of this thesis investigate new definitions, constructions, and proof tech-
niques to achieve this in the realm of adversarial machine learning. We show that our new defi-
nitions allow for provable security guarantees in a restricted but still practical attack setting. Our
security reduction yields an new adversarial attack setting which is applicable to standard classi-
fiers and yields more reliable empirical validation. Our new security definitions are well-behaved
with standard generalization accuracy in the sense that higher standard accuracy yields a tighter
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upper bound on adversarial error. This chapter is based off work in [4].
Our construction works in a black-box setting, which practitioners often think of in the machine
learning as a service model, where users interact with a classifier hosted on an external server. A
user is only allowed to remotely query this server and cannot see the underlying code running on the
server which produces the classification output. However this model requires a completely trusted
third-party server, and many algorithms which are cryptographically secure in a black-box setting
are not secure when the source code is visible. Many services nowadays are run on cloud platforms
such as Amazon Web Services, leading to a centralization of trust that a single company will not
give out unauthorized access to the underlying code running on the platform. Cryptographers
would prefer to replace this trust with a mathematical guarantee that the company hosting the
server cannot glean any information from the code being run even if they acted maliciously.
The third chapter explores the field of cryptographic obfuscation which addresses this problem.
The goal of obfuscation is to encrypt a function such that anyone can obtain input-output behavior
from the encrypted function, but no other information can be extracted. This formalizes what
we mean by a black-box, but unfortunately positive results in black-box obfuscation have been
limited. Historically, most research in this area has focused on trying to achieve obfuscation for
very general function classes, which necessitated strong security assumptions that lacked empirical
footing. We take the opposite approach of just trying to achieve obfuscation for a limited function
class similar to an ensemble classifier voting scheme and basing the security off more standard and
tested cryptographic assumptions. This work was previously published as [5].
The last chapter takes the opposite perspective of the attacker. We investigate alternative ap-
proaches to the standard statistical loss optimization view of machine learning. We propose that
cryptanalysis can be viewed as a machine learning problem in the sense that the goal of crypt-
analysis is to learn the input-output mapping of some target encryption function. We show how
a standard cryptanalysis technique, the LLL Lattice Basis Reduction algorithm, can be modified
to solve parameter recovery problems in machine learning. This chapter is based off previously
published work [6] and [7] which explore two variants of classical machine learning problems.
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Chapter 2: Adversarial machine learning
Current machine learning models are vulnerable at test time to adversarial examples, which are
data points that have been imperceptibly modified from legitimate data points but are misclassified
with high confidence. This phenomenon was first described by [2], who constructed a simple attack
that resembled gradient descent on the feature space. This fast gradient sign method computed the
gradient of the loss function with respect to the feature space, took the sign of the gradient values,
and then added it to the feature values with a small constant factor. Followup work constructed
more efficient attacks by iteratively applying this gradient method [8][9] or by solving a direct
constrained optimization problem [10].
These attacks all required access to the explicit loss function and parameter settings of the
trained classifier, and so black-box models which only revealed the final class label output of the
model seemed like a potential method to hide the gradients. Unfortunately, a major show-stopper
with black-box models is the phenomenon of transferability [11], where an adversarial perturbation
computed for an independently trained model has a high chance of being a successful attack against
a separate black-box oracle model. This independently trained model is called a substitute model.
Even if the adversary is only given black-box oracle access to predicted labels, existing machine
learning models are vulnerable to transfer learning attacks executed by training substitute models
[12]. The transfer success rate is the probability that an adversarial example computed for the
substitute model is also misclassified by the black-box oracle.
Direct query-based attacks such as zeroth order optimization [13] and boundary attack [14]
have also emerged as alternative black-box attacks without training substitute models. These at-
tacks initialize with any misclassified data point on the other side of the decision boundary and
iteratively perform rejection sampling to find a misclassified point closer to the decision boundary.
This technique requires at least 104 adaptive queries to the classifier, which means the choice of the
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next query point depends on the result obtained for the previous query points. In contrast, transfer-
based attacks from training substitute models can succeed using a much smaller number of between
0 to 10 epochs of adaptive queries, where multiple queries can be presented simultaneously in each
epoch.
Researchers have tried many avenues of constructing defenses to prevent these attacks. Previ-
ous work has attempted to train models to be explicitly robust to attacks by incorporating robust-
ness into the optimization problem [15][16], by input transformations and discretization to reduce
model linearity [17], or by injecting randomness at inference time [18]. However defenses based
on robust training have been subsequently broken by changing the space of allowable perturbations
[19], and other defenses have been broken by more sophisticated attacks [20].
Recent explanations suggest that the existence of adversarial examples is actually inevitable in
high-dimensional spaces. [21] [22][23] suggest that these examples exist for any linear classifier
with nonzero error rate under additive Gaussian noise. This vulnerability is a simple geometrical
fact when the dimension d is large: because most of the mass of a Gaussian distribution is concen-
trated near the shell, the distance to the closest misclassified example is a factor d1/2 closer than
the distance to the shell. [24] argue that adversarial perturbations can actually be robust features
for generalization, and thus their adversarial nature is just a misalignment with our natural human
notions of robustness.
In light of the evidence for the inevitability of adversarial perturbations, one goal we can still
hope to achieve is a computational separation between declaring their existence and finding one.
We propose a solution which uses hidden random bits that behave like a cryptographic key, mean-
ing that any instantiation of the random bits works with high probability, but an attacker should
not be able to attack the overall classifier without knowing the random bits. The space of all pos-
sible random bits in our construction will be exponential in the number of classes, so guessing the
random bits is intractable.
In order to hide the randomness in a single classifier, we use a black-box ensemble scheme
in which the adversary learns only the output of the overall ensemble without learning the output
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of any individual classifiers. Previous ensemble techniques for increasing adversarial robustness
only subsample or augment the training data within each class [25], whereas our ensemble samples
random splits of the labels themselves within the overall multiclass classification setup. This means
that the underlying classification problem is unknown to the adversary, and we argue that this
randomness decreases the transfer success rate. In addition, our ensemble construction is allowed
to abstain from making a prediction, which behaves functionally like a built-in adversarial example
detector and amplifies the robustness gain within each individual classifier.
Because the scope of attacks an adversary can mount is so large, we restrict our adversary to a
constant number of epochs of adaptive queries. This still captures practical attacks such as transfer-
based attacks that train substitute models from a constant number of epochs, but does not capture
iterative attacks making tens of thousands of adaptive queries. In the case of just a single epoch of
adaptive queries, we prove that the adversarial test error converges to twice the standard test error
as the number of classes increases. The proof is based on a new security assumption which is in
principle simpler to empirically verify than the entire construction, and we provide evidence for it
on CIFAR-10 against projected gradient descent [8] and momentum iterative gradient method [9]
attacks. We also provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of this defense against 10 epochs
of adaptive queries on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets using a standard substitute model attack
benchmark by [26].
2.1 Preliminaries
Let X ⊂ Rd be the feature space, and let Y = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of classes. The learning
problem is to construct a multiclass classifier F : X → Y ∪ {ω} that is allowed to abstain from
making a prediction by returning the symbol ω. We assume all classifier training is conducted
using a fixed training algorithm for binary classification ML which is public knowledge. ML takes
as input a set of binary-labeled data points {(xi, zi)}ni=1, where each xi ∈ X and zi ∈ {±1},
and outputs a binary classifier f : X → {±1}. The multiclass training data {(xi, yi}) is public
knowledge, and the binary classifiers are trained over this data set by defining a mapping φ :
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{1, . . . , N} → {±1} that takes each data point (xi, yi) to (xi, φ(yi)). Furthermore, we assume
that ML({(xi, zi)})ni=1 = −ML({(xi,−zi)})ni=1, which just means that if the labels −1 and 1 were
reversed in the training data, then the trained classifier would be identical except for outputting
the opposite sign . Lastly, we fix some space P ⊂ X to be the set of allowable adversarial
perturbations; a commonly used perturbation space is {ρ ∈ X | ‖ρ‖∞ < c}, which for example
constrains each pixel in an image to be modified by a small vaule.
2.1.a Threat model
We consider the setting of a server hosting a fixed classifier F : X → {1, . . . , N, ω} and
users who interact with the server by presenting a query q ∈ X to the server and receiving the
output label F (q). We call F a black-box classifier, because the user does not see any of the
intermediate computation values of F (q). Two types of users access the server: honest users
who present queries drawn from a natural data distribution, and adversarial users who present
adversarial examples designed to intentionally cause a misclassification. The desired property is
to serve the honest users the true label while simultaneously preventing the adversarial users from
causing a misclassification; the latter is accomplished by either continuing to return the true label
on adversarial examples or by returning the abstain label ω.
In order for this distinction to be well-defined, we need to separate natural misclassified ex-
amples from adversarial examples. We achieve this by fixing in advance a data point x which
is correctly classified by F (x) and requiring the adversary to compute a perturbation ρ ∈ P for
this specific x such that F (x + ρ) 6∈ {F (x), ω}. We think of x as a parameter of the attack, for
example the natural image of the face of an attacker who wishes to masquerade as someone else.
The classifier F is secure for x if, with high probability over the construction of F , the adversary
cannot find a ρ satisfying this.
We formalize this attack problem by the notion of a security challenge. The adversary is given
all the information about F except for any internal randomness used to initialize F . The adversary
is then given the challenge point (x, y) with F (x) = y being the correct classification, and the
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adversary successfully solves the security challenge if he finds a ρ such that F (x+ρ) 6∈ {ω, F (x)}
with non-negligible probability. The solution to the security challenge is a successful attack.
The separation between existence of a solution and feasibility of finding it is given by resource
constraints on the adversary, most commonly in the form of runtime. We say that a security chal-
lenge is computationally secure if there does not exist an algorithm for finding a solution within
these resource constraints. In addition to runtime, we also consider the constraint of how many
times the adversary is allowed to interact with the classifier.
We make a distinction between these query points (denoted by q) and the challenge point
(denoted by x), both of which are feature vectors in X . Query points are arbitrarily chosen by
the adversary for the purpose of learning more about the black-box F , and there is no notion of
correctness for F (q). The ability to obtain labels for arbitrary query points is the key factor that
enables the adversary to mount more powerful black-box attacks; without query access, the attacker
is limited to relatively simple transfer-based attacks from models trained on standard datasets.
We leverage this distinction to obtain a provable security guarantee by using cryptographic proof
techniques.
2.1.b Security proofs in cryptography
Instead of directly trying to prove the security of F , we define a simpler system f that is easier
to empirically test and reason about. We then prove a reduction from the security challenge of F
to the security challenge of f , which shows that F is at least as hard to attack as f . We define
a security assumption that characterizes the hardness of attacking f . This security assumption is
not mathematically proven to be true, but nonetheless defining the right assumption makes the
reduction is useful, because this assumption can be easier to empirically study. If the security
assumption is true, then F is secure. The security assumption we define is the hardness of attacking
a new type of randomized classifier without any query access to it.
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2.1.c Random binary classifiers
In a multiclass classification problem with labels 1, . . . , N , suppose we have a binary classifier
f : X → {±1} for two particular classes y and t, where class y is mapped to +1 and class t is
mapped to−1. An adversary is given a data point (x, y) with f(x) = +1, and the adversary wishes
to attack this binary classifier by computing a perturbation ρ such that f(x + ρ) = −1. If f were
a standard binary classifier trained on the y versus t classification problem, then this would be a
straightforward transfer attack scenario. However, instead f is trained with all remaining N − 2
classes also having been randomly remapped to ±1 with equal probability. In other words, for
each class k 6∈ {y, t}, we sample a Rademacher random variable zk ∼ {±1} and assign every
data point of original label k to the new binary label zk. This random assignment does not change
the original y-vs-t classification task when all data points are only of original class y or t. The
resulting f corresponding to training with the random binary labels {±1}N−2 is a random binary
classifier:
Definition 1 (Random binary classifier). Let D be a distribution over {±1}N . The random binary
classifier over D is the distribution of f over z ∼ D where each training data point xi is relabeled








The security challenge for the random binary classifier is to compute a perturbation that changes
its output with high probability over the sampling of z.
Definition 2 (Security challenge for random binary classifier). Let fz := ML{(xi, zyi)}ni=1. Let
z ∼ {±1}N be a Rademacher random vector, and let Dyt be the distribution of z conditioned on
zy = +1, zt = −1. The security challenge for a challenge data point (x, y), failure rate δ > 0,
and target label t 6= y is to compute a perturbation ρ ∈ P which changes the output of fz(x) with
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failure rate no greater than δ:
Pr
z∼Dyt
[fz(x+ ρ) 6= fz(x)] > 1− δ.
In particular, the adversary has no ability to obtain labels for query points from the random binary
classifier.
Note that the adversary has knowledge of two of the bits of z, corresponding to the original
label y and some target label t 6= y. Our security assumption is that for any ρ ∈ P , there is enough
randomness in the remaining N − 2 data classes such that the failure rate is non-negligible.
Assumption 1 (Security assumption). Given an instance of the security challenge for a random
binary classifier with parameters defined as in Definition 2, for any ρ ∈ P , for all c > 0, there




fz(x+ ρ) 6= f(x)
] ≤ 1− 1/N c
whenever N ≥ N0.
Note that this implicitly assumes P does not contain any non-adversarial perturbations, such
as those of the form x′−x where x′ is a legitimate image of class t. This assumption also does not
place any computational constraints on the adversary yet; the security comes from the randomness
in z ∼ Dyt, which is sampled after ρ is already fixed. In Section 2.4.a, we experimentally jus-
tify this assumption by estimating the transfer success probability for all pairs of classes (y, t) in
the CIFAR-10 dataset using the standard `∞-ball for P and two different state-of-the-art transfer
attacks.
We give two reasons why this assumption is the right one to make. Firstly, the scope of attacks
to analyze is greatly reduced when the attacker has no access to the classifier. The adversary can
essentially only mount transfer learning attacks by training models on the public dataset. Secondly,
we only require the probability of success of the adversary to be bounded below 1 by a constant,
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and the overall security of the ensemble can be boosted from this bound.
2.1.d Main construction
Recall that our goal is to construct a multiclass classifier F : X −→ {1, 2, . . . , N, ω} which is
allowed to abstain from making a prediction (as represented by the output ω), and an adversarial
perturbation ρ is only considered a successful attack if F (x+ ρ) 6∈ {F (x), ω}.
Our ensemble construction is the error-correcting code approach for multiclass-to-binary re-
duction [27], except with completely random codes for security purposes.
Construction 1 (Random ensemble classifier). Given a multiclass classification problem with la-
bels Y = {1, . . . , N}, a codelength M , and a threshold parameter r ∈ (0, 1/3):
• Sample random matrix Z ∈ {±1}N×M , where each Zij ∼ {±1} independently and with
equal probability
• For j = 1, . . . ,M , construct the binary classifier fj = ML
({(xi, Zyij)}ni=1)
Given a query data point x, compute output F (x) by:
• Compute the predicted codeword vector C(x) := (f1(x), . . . , fM(x))
• Compute (d∗, y∗) = min
y
‖Zy − C(x)‖H , where y∗ is the index and d∗ is the Hamming
distance to Zy∗
• If d∗ < Mr, then output y∗, else output ω
In this construction, the codeword Zy ∈ {±1}M acts as the identity of class y, and thus the
classification of a data point x is the class codeword which is closest to its predicted codeword
C(x). We should think of the free parameters as M = Ω(poly(N)) and r = O(1/N). M needs to
be sufficiently large in order for the random ensemble classifier to be accurate on natural examples.
The parameter r should be greater than the standard test error of a trained classifier, or otherwise
the ensemble will abstain on too many legitimate test samples. However r must be small enough
for security purposes, which we will quantify in our main theorem.
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We give some intuition for why this construction has desirable security properties. In order
for an adversary to change the overall output of some test point (x, y), he needs to change the
output of sufficiently many binary classifiers fj so that C(x+ρ) is close to some codeword Zt, t 6=
y. But the Hamming distance between Zy and Zt is M/2 on expectation, and x, x + ρ must be
within distance Mr to Zy, Zt respectively. Since each fi is constructed independently at random,
the overall probability of success is exponentially decreasing in the probability of successfully
changing the output of an individual classifier.
We proceed to define the security challenge for this construction. We will use the shorthand
notation Z ∼ {±1}N×M to denote the distribution of Z ∈ {±1}N×M where each entry is indepen-
dently sampled from {±1} with equal probability.
Definition 3 (Security challenge for random ensemble). Let FZ(·) be the ensemble classifier con-
structed with random hidden code matrix Z as defined in Construction 1. The security challenge
for a challenge data point (x, y) and accuracy ε ∈ (0, 1) is a two-round protocol:
1. ProvideQ nonadaptive queries to FZ(·) and receive answer labels, denoted by {(qk, ak)}Qk=1.
The queries cannot depend on the hidden random code Z, but can otherwise depend on the
public information such as the training data and the oracle ML.





FZ(x+ ρ) 6∈ {FZ(x), ω}
]
> ε,
An algorithm for solving the security challenge is determined by its query set {qk}Qk=1 and the
function φ for computing the final perturbation from the query answers.
For example, one possible attack captured by this definition is training a substitute model with
a one epoch of data augmentation obtained from querying the classifier, as described by [12]. The
adversary starts with a pre-labeled dataset of arbitrary size, usually the public training data set, and
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trains an initial substitute model. The adversary then refines this initial model by using Jacobian
data augmentation to add new synthetic data points to the training data. In each epoch of data
augmentation, the adversary obtains labels for these synthetic points using the black-box classifier.
The synthetic data points are the queries q1, . . . , qQ, and thus our proof guarantees security
against a single epoch of data augmentation. The actual implementation of this attack in [26] uses
10 substitute training epochs, and our proof does not apply directly to this implementation, because
the second round of queries can depend on the answers in the first round. Nonetheless, we show
empirically in Section 2.4.b that our construction is still secure against the benchmark of 10 data
augmentation epochs.
2.2 Security results
The main theoretical result is a reduction from solving the random classifier challenge to solv-
ing the random ensemble challenge. In our reduction, we make the simplifying assumption that
the space of allowable perturbations P is the same in both security challenges. This allows us to
get away with not explicitly defining which perturbations are adversarial and which are legitimate,
because a perturbation which makes x + ρ a legitimate image of the class t would solve both se-
curity challenges simultaneously. We also assume without loss of generality that r is chosen such
that Mr ∈ Z, because Hamming distance is an integer.
Theorem 4. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that can solve the security challenge for the
random ensemble with any threshold r ∈ (0, 1/2) such that Mr ∈ Z using Q queries and with
accuracy ε ∈ (0, 1). Then there is an algorithm that can compute a perturbation ρ which solves
















where H2(r) = −r log2 r − (1 − r) log2(1 − r) is the negative entropy function and can be
bounded away from 1 when r is bounded away from 1/2.
The theorem shows that if such an algorithm A exists, r = O(1/N), and M = Ω(poly(N)),
then the failure rate decreases as O(1/N c) for some constant c, which contradicts the security
assumption (Assumption 1). Conversely, if the security assumption is true, then an adversary
cannot solve the security challenge for the random ensemble withO(poly(N)) nonadaptive queries
to the ensemble classifier. When r < δ
2
and the security assumption is true, the theorem gives the










Recall that the parameter r needs to be greater than the standard test error of a random binary
classifier for good standard test accuracy of the ensemble, but less than δ
2
for good adversarial
accuracy. The more accurate each random binary classifier is, the smaller we can set the value of
r to be, which in turn gives a smaller upper bound on the adversarial test error ε. This shows that
our definition of adversarial test error is compatible with standard test error.
We give a brief proof sketch here, deferring the full proof to Section 2.3. Given a single random
classifier fz, we can simulate the entire ensemble classifier FZ by constructing the remainingM−1
random classifiers using the public data set and ML. However, we cannot apply A to FZ directly,
because in Definition 2 there is no query access to fz. Thus we first show in Lemma 2.3.1 that we
can simulate the output of the entire ensemble using only M − 1 classifiers with high probability.
Applying the algorithmA the ensemble of M − 1 classifiers produces an attack perturbation ρ.
Since this simulates the ensemble of M classifiers with high probability, then this attack perturba-
tion also applies to the entire ensemble of M classifiers. Now we want to compute the probability
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of the output of each individual classifier in the ensemble being changed, but the Q queries could
potentially leak information about some column Zj . We use Lemma 2.3.1 for each column j to
show that this is not the case; i.e. that the query answers are completely determined by the re-
maining M − 1 columns with high probability and thus independent of column j itself. Then we
show in Lemma 2.3.3 that an overall success probability of ε gives an upper bound on δ for each
individual classifier.
2.3 Proofs
Lemma 2.3.1. Fix any query point q and threshold r < 1/2 such that Mr ∈ Z. Given a random
ensemble function FZ : X → {1, . . . , N} withM independently and identically generated random
classifiers and threshold r < 1/3, fix some j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and let FZ−j denote the modified






] ≤ 4N√ 1− r
2piMr
2−M(1−H2(r)),
where the probability is taken only over the matrix Z−j and is independent of the column Zj .
H2(r) = −r log2 r − (1 − r) log2(1 − r) can be bounded away from 1 when r is bounded away
from 1/2.
The lemma shows that for any j, with high probability over Z−j the query answer FZ(q)
is independent of Zj , so that no information is revealed by the queries about column j. In the
following proofs we will use the shorthand fj := fZj , i.e. the random classifier constructed from
the jth column of Z.
Proof. The only way the additional classification output of fj(q) can influence the decision of the
entire ensemble of FZ−j(q) is if the predicted codeword of lengthM−1 is on the decision boundary
between some class i and the abstaining space corresponding to ω. In the boolean hypercube
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Because we want our probability bound to hold true regardless of the value of fj , we have to
consider the possibility of fj(q) influencing the points on either side of the decision boundary. To
account for this, we multiply the number by 2. Then over all N classes, the number of possible




















We now apply the binomial coefficient upper bound from [28], reproduced below:








where H2(λ) = −λ log2 λ− (1− λ) log2(1− λ) is the negative entropy function.








where H2(r) = −r log2 r − (1 − r) log2(1 − r) is the negative entropy function. Thus the










Since H2(r) is bounded away from 1 when r is bounded away from 1/2, this gives an expo-
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nentially decaying probability bound in M .
The next lemma is a concentration result that holds when no information is revealed by the
queries about any individual column.
Lemma 2.3.3. Suppose that the event fj(x + ρ) 6= fj(x) is independent and identical for each
column j. Fix a data point (x, y). Given a perturbation ρ which solves the security challenge
for the random ensemble with target probability ε > 0, then for every random classifier in the
ensemble, ρ solves the security challenge for it with failure rate δ < 2(r +
√
log(1/ε)/2M)
Proof. Recall that the adversary is said to have solved the security challenge for the random en-
semble if the vector of code bits CZ(x+ ρ) := (f1(x+ ρ), . . . , fM(x+ ρ)) has Hamming distance
less than Mr to any other codeword Zi, where i 6= y. Since each entry of the code matrix is
sampled independently, we can consider the probability of this event bit-by-bit.
Let Etj be the event where fj(x+ρ) = Ztj . Let Et be the probability of the event where ‖CZ(x+
ρ′)−Zt‖1 ≤Mr, meaning the codeword for class t is the closest. By the independence assumption,
we have Pr[Et] = Pr[X > M(1− r)] where X ∼ Binom(M,Pr[Etj]), or equivalently,
Pr[Et] = Pr
[
X < Mr |X ∼ Binom(M, 1−Pr[Etj])
]
. (2.2)
The probability of changing F (x) from y to any other class can be bounded by applying the
union bound to all t 6= y. We obtain
Pr[FZ(x+ ρ) 6= FZ(x)] ≤ (N − 1) Pr[Et],
and by the assumption of the lemma we know the left-hand side probability is δ > 0. Thus we just
need to compute Pr[Eij] and apply a tail inequality for the binomial distribution.
Fix one underlying code bit j and some other class t 6= y. Each bit Ztj differs from the
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corresponding bit of Cyj with probability 1/2 under the random code sampling scheme. Without
loss of generality, we’ll let Zyj = +1. We analyze the probability of the event fj(x+ ρ) = Ztj by
conditioning on Ztj , obtaining
Pr







fj(x+ ρ) = +1|Ztj = +1, Zyj = +1
]
.
We note that the term Pr[fj(x + ρ) = −1|Ztj = −1, Zyj = +1] is exactly the the probability
1− δ in Definition 2. Then Pr[Etj] can be bounded by
Pr[Etj] ≤ 1
2
(1− δ) + 1
2
(1) = 1− δ
2
.
Then the probability in (2.2) can be bounded by using Hoeffding’s inequality, which states that
given X ∼ Binom(M, p), for any α > 0,
Pr
[
X ≤ (p− α)M] ≤ exp (−2Mα2) .
We let X =
∑
j Etj , so p < 1− δ2 and α < p+ r− 1 = r− δ2 . Applying Hoeffding’s inequality
with these parameters yields








Pr[Et ≤ Mr] is the probability of the perturbation ρ solving the security challenge for the










We solve for δ as a function of ε to obtain the failure probability of solving the security challenge















Proof of Theorem 4. We are given an instance of the security challenge for a random binary classi-
fier (Definition 2). Let fz be the random binary classifier, where z ∼ {±1}N is uniformly sampled.
We can simulate an entire random ensemble by constructing M − 1 additional random classifiers
in the same way that fz is sampled, so that f1 = fz and f2, . . . , fM are freshly sampled. Let Z−j
denote the matrix Z without the jth column, so that FZ−j : X → {1, . . . , N} denotes the output of
the random ensemble ignoring fj .
By the definition of the security challenge, the adversary cannot query f1; however since FZ−1
is simulated by the adversary, he can make queries to FZ−1 and run A to produce a perturbation ρ
attacking FZ−1 . But if FZ−1(qi) = FZ(qi) for each query qi, thenA would have produced the same
perturbation ρ attacking FZ .
By Lemma 2.3.1 and a union bound over the number of queries, the hypothetical query answers
a1, . . . , aQ to the entire ensemble FZ depend only on FZ−1 with probability at least
1− Pr
Z−1




Now in order to apply Lemma 2.3.3 to bound ε as a function of δ, we want to show for each j
that the event fj(x+ ρ) 6= fj(x) is independent of the query answers a1, . . . , aQ. This can be done
by applying Lemma 2.3.1 again to each column j to show that with high probability, the query
answers only depend on the random sampling of Z−j . Since ρ = φ({ak}Qk=1) is a function of the














fj(x+ ρ) 6= fj(x)
]
,
and we see that this probability has no dependence on the actual column j since Zj is independent
and identical for each j. We incur a factor M in the probability of failure by applying a union
bound of the failure probability in (2.3) over all j = 1, . . . ,M . Thus the event fj(x + ρ) 6= fj(x)
















We provide empirical analysis on the security assumption (Assumption 1) and the adversarial
test accuracy against black-box substitute model training attacks for the MNIST [29] and CIFAR-
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10 [30] datasets. We use code from the CleverHans adversarial examples library [26] and from
the MadryLab CIFAR10 adversarial examples challenge [31] for the base classifier architecture,
training, and attacks. The only modification to the base classifier architecture was to change the
output layer from dimension 10 to dimension 2 for a binary output; no further architecture tuning
was performed to optimize natural accuracy.
2.4.a Analysis of random binary classifiers
First, we empirically estimate the transfer success rate for all pairs of classes. We train a sample
size of 40 random binary classifiers and then compute an adversarial perturbation for each test data
point and each target class. The perturbation is computed by using a pre-trained standard model
for the respective dataset with all N output dimensions. We then compute whether each random
binary classifier makes a different prediction on the original test data point versus the perturbed
test data point. Finally, for each pair (y, t), we empirically estimate the probability of the output of
fz(·) being changed conditioned on zy 6= zt and plot this. The goal of this analysis is to show that
this probability is bounded below 1 by a constant.
We use the Projected Gradient Descent and the Momentum Iterated Gradient Descent transfer
attacks on the cross-entropy loss with an `∞ norm bound of ε = 8. The pre-trained substitute
is a w28-10 wide residual network [32], and the random binary classifiers are the same ResNet
architecture but with two output dimensions instead of ten. We visualize the average-case success
probability in an N ×N grid where the (y, t) coordinate shows the attack success probability over
original data points of class y and target label t. The color of each cell represents the probability
using the Viridis color palette shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Viridis color palette, uniformly scaled from 0 to 1
Figure 2.2 shows the empirical success probabilities of the attack over the CIFAR-10 data set
for all pairs of classes.
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Figure 2.2: Success probabilities for targeted attacks on CIFAR-10 random binary classifiers
In the image, the cell (4, 6) appears to have the highest probability, and the entire column
y = 6 (frog) appears to have particularly high average success rate as a target class. For our
security definition, we are interested in worst-case attack success rates, so we plot the distribution
over each test data point for the (y, t) pairs (4, 6) and (5, 3). Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show the
individual success rates for MIGM and PGD, respectively.















Figure 2.3: Distribution of success probabilities for individual CIFAR10 test data points under
PGD attack
We see that among the (y, t) pairs where t 6= 6, the security definition needed for our main
theorem is satisfied with high probability over the test examples. However, many of the examples
are vulnerable to a targeted attack with target class t = 6. This suggests that the Frog class is
especially distinct from the other 9 classes, such that even when it is randomly included in a binary
partition, the neural network still builds a kind of frog detector separate from the other randomly
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of success probabilities for individual CIFAR10 test data points under
MIGM attack
included classes.
2.4.b Analysis of black-box adversarial accuracy
Next, we empirically analyze the robustness of our random ensemble construction to black-
box transfer learning attacks. Instead of performing a transfer attack from a standard model, these
attacks train a specific substitute model by querying the black-box classifier directly. We use the
CleverHans attack library [26] to benchmark this. The attack algorithm trains a two-layer fully
connected substitute model iteratively augmenting its training data set via queries to the random
ensemble scheme and then uses the Fast Gradient Sign Method on the substitute model.
Because the attack library is not designed for querying classifier which abstains, we perform
substitute model training with a non-abstaining random ensemble (i.e. r = 1/2). We consider
the threshold r at the end when analyzing the final true and adversarial test accuracies. In order to
incorporate the abstain label, we use the following definitions of accuracy for our experiments. The
true test accuracy requires the classifier to make the correct, non-abstaining prediction. However
when computing adversarial accuracy, we also consider it a success if the classifier outputs ω.
Definition 5 (True and adversarial test accuracy). Given a multiclass classifier
F : X → {1, · · · , N, ω} which is allowed to abstain from making a prediction (as represented by
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the output ω), the relevant accuracy benchmarks are
True accuracy := E
(x,y)
[
1[F (x) = y]
]
Adversarial accuracy := E
(x̂,y)
[
1[F (x̂) ∈ {y, ω}]] ,
where x is the original data point and x̂ is an adversarial perturbation of x.
All random binary classifiers used in these experiments are the same architecture as the random
binary classifiers in Section 2.4.a. Figure 2.5 shows that the ensemble enjoys good adversarial
accuracy in the low-r regime.
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Figure 2.5: Accuracy versus Hamming distance ratio (r)
2.5 Analysis of adversarial features
While these black-box defenses are a promising line of research for constructing secure ma-
chine learning models, they do not give much insight as to why adversarial examples actually
exist. The idea of non-robust features [24] is proposed as a mechanism to explain the tradeoff
between adversarial error and standard test error. The non-robust features used by adversarial
attacks are well-generalizing features that happen to be human-unrecognizable because of a mis-
alignment between the `p metric and the metric in the intrinsic data space. The authors argue for
the existence of non-robust features by two experiments. Firstly, removing non-robust features
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decreases standard test performance. Secondly, after mislabeling the original training data {xi, yi}
to {xi + ∆(xi, yti), yti}, where yti 6= yi is a different target class and ∆(xi, yti) is an adversarial
perturbation towards yti , a trained classifier still achieves nontrivial test accuracy.
In this section, we look to understand this phenomenon in the interpolation regime in the second
stage of the double descent curve [33]. While conventional machine learning suggests that the
optimal test accuracy is achieved before training accuracy reaches 100%, the double descent curve
suggests that test accuracy increases as we continue to train after 100% train accuracy, possibly
even converging to a higher value. An intuitive explanation of this phenomenon, given by [34],
is that overfitting incorrectly labeled training points more sharply decreases the size of the sample
space which is incorrectly classified.
We give a simple model illustrating this phenomenon using purely random noise; that is, we
show that augmenting noisy features with purely random features can in fact increase test accuracy
in the interpolating regime. This is stronger than the result by [35] for linear regression, which
showed only that random features were benign with regards to test risk. We show empirically that
random features can increase classification performance for linear models and argue that random
features increase the number of support vectors in an SVM, which can be a desirable behavior
in the case of weak features. These results suggest that adversarial examples aren’t necessarily
a result of non-robust features, but rather of random noise being beneficial for helping standard
optimization algorithms avoid overfitting to weak features. In other words, adversarial examples
are a result of both suboptimal optimization algorithms and insufficient sample sizes.
2.5.a Random feature model
We consider a mixture of two Gaussians as a classification problem with label y ∈ {±1}. Let
µ ∈ Rd+ be a mean vector with nonnegative entries. LetA ∈ Rn×d be a matrix of independent noisy
features, where each sample is drawn fromN (yµ, Id). LetB ∈ Rn×k be the matrix of independent
random features, where each sample is drawn fromN (0, γ2Ik). Let X = [A|B] be the matrix of n
data points, with n/2 generated from each class.
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Since the covariance matrix is the identity, the Bayes optimal classifier for this is to estimate
the empirical mean µ̂A = 12nA
ty over just the noisy features. Given a new test point (x, y) where
x = (a, b) is sampled as a ∼ N (yµ, Id), b ∼ N (0, γIk), the classification output is sign(〈a, µ̂〉) =
sign(〈a,ATy〉).
We illustrate the double descent phenomenon with an empirical example using the parameter
settings n = 2000, d = 500, µ = 0.05, σ = 1.0, γ = 0.1, and k = 24000. Figure 2.6 shows that
test accuracy continues to increase while adversarial accuracy decreases as we add in additional
random features even after training accuracy has reached 1.0.
Figure 2.6: Test accuracy with random features. Left: SVM. Right: Logistic Regression
To show that these random features do indeed cause convergence to the correct model, we look
at the signs of the feature weights for the d weak features. Every single weak feature is positively
correlated with the label y, so each feature weight should be positive. Figure 2.7 shows that many
feature weights are negative when using only weak features, but as random features are added to
the model, the learned feature weights converge to the correct sign.
This suggests that the presence of random features decreases overfitting on the weak features.
In the classical bias-variance regime, minimizing training error causes overfitting on the weights
on the weak features in order interpolate the training data. In the interpolation regime, however,
allowing the classifier to interpolate the training data using random, meaningless features makes
the weights on the weak features more accurate. Because the random features are an order of mag-
nitude smaller than the weak features, overfitting on the random features has diminished impact on
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Figure 2.7: Average sign of weights for weak features.
classification accuracy over a test sample. We next analyze the effect of adding random features to
an existing support vector machine solution in order to quantify how this may work.
2.5.b Support vector analysis
We consider the SVM model as an illustrative case which shows the effect of random features.
The hinge loss has many of the properties of the ReLU activation function in terms of determining
which data points are actively contributing to the weight vector, so the results can potentially be
applied to explaining the activation of hidden units in a ReLU layer. Classical error bounds for
support vector machines increase as the number of support vectors increases [36], but in the case
of weak features, we show that the opposite effect occurs.
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The indicator function 1[yiwTxi ≤ 1] indicates whether the data point (xi, yi) is a support




i=1 yixi is an estimate of the true mean vector µ, whereas the SVM solution is an estimate of
the true mean vector using only support vectors as samples.
We show that random features cause the algorithm to use additional support vectors to estimate
the weight vector. Let w be a solution to the original SVM objective with d weak features only,
and consider the effect of adding k additional random features. We initialize the feature weights
wd+1, . . . , wd+k = 0 and analyze a two-stage optimization process of fitting the weight vector for





























We consider the case where (xi, yi) is not a support vector, in which case 1i = 0. The additive
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z1z2, where m =
∑
s 6=i 1s and z1, z2 ∼ N (0, γ2). Then the














] ≥ (1− θ)2 E[Z]2
E[Z2]
.
Letting Z = |z1z2| be the half-normal distribution and using the fact that z1z2 is symmetric


















































Thus as the number of random features k increases, at least 1/5 of non-support vectors become
support vectors and help in estimating feature weights for the weak features. If the original number
of support vectors was small, then this explains why the addition of purely random features can
increase standard test accuracy. Figure 2.8 confirms empirically that number of support vectors
increases with the number of random features in the model.
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Figure 2.8: Number of support vectors. Total n = 2000
This example suggests that non-robust features are not necessarily meaningful or positively
correlated with the class labels in any way. Rather, standard optimization algorithms used to train
machine learning models can behave poorly in the presence of weak features, leading to a worse
model estimate than the Bayes optimal estimator. Adding purely random features can help regu-
larize this behavior.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter makes some progress towards resolving the apparent misalignment between ad-
versarial error and standard test error. We gave a novel construction with a provable guarantee
that the adversarial test error converges to a constant multiple of the standard test error when the
adversary is limited to black-box substitute model attacks. The security of our scheme can be
quantitatively estimated this particular class of attacks by measuring our security assumption. Em-
pirical results show that the security assumption holds for most pairs of classes, and the ensemble
shows good accuracy against a benchmark substitute model training attack library.
Our security reduction makes it easy to analyze the security of new classifier architectures
designed specifically for random binary classifiers. Optimizing the architecture of the individual
classifiers used in the ensemble against our security assumption is an interesting direction of future
work. One important item to note is that the random ensemble construction is not compatible with
standard techniques of robust training. Robust training tends to decrease the standard test error
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of the classifier, which means that a larger threshold r needs to be used to account for natural
errors in the individual random classifiers. However, a larger r value leads to weaker security in
the ensemble.
We also gave an illustrative example of how purely random features can explain both vulnera-
bility to adversarial perturbations and the double descent curve phenomenon in the case of linear
models. It would be interesting to understand how random features generalize to the individual
layers in a ReLU network. The random features result also suggests the following technique for
defending against adversarial attacks. We embed each training image into a much larger unrelated
image and train the classifier over this entire image using the original label. At test time, however,
the unrelated image areas are dropped out, so the classifier is only applied to the original image
area. The appended unrelated image behaves like random noise which the classifier can use to
interpolate; however because it is dropped out at test time, the adversary cannot leverage these
weights to attack the classifier.
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Chapter 3: Cryptographic obfuscation
3.1 Introduction
The discipline of cryptography is fundamentally about the separation of seemingly intertwined
information and abilities: how do we separate the ability the compute a function from the ability to
invert a function? How do we separate the ability to encrypt from the ability to decrypt? How do we
separate partial knowledge of a key through a side-channel attack from the ability to compromise a
cryptographic scheme? The study of cryptographic obfuscation is born from the question: how do
we separate the ability to run code from the ability to read code? Since the seminal work of [37]
that placed this question firmly on a rigorous theoretical foundation, it has been clear that this
kind of separation would be powerful, both inside and outside the typical reach of the discipline of
cryptography.
If we can hide secrets inside functioning software, we can protect cryptographic keys, and many
of cryptography’s disparate and hard won achievements follow as a consequence. We can also
protect intellectual property, and the inner workings of critical code like software patches, which
in their unprotected form might leak information that could be used to attack remaining vulnerable
machines. But as with any cryptographic primitive, the suitability of program obfuscation for any
particular task depends on three main axes by which we must evaluate proposed constructions:
(1) efficiency, (2) the underlying computational and architectural assumptions, and (3) the derived
security guarantees.
Two possibiilities for (3), defined in [37], are the notion of virtual black box obfusction (VBB)
and the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO). Virtual black box obfuscation is a very
powerful and intuitive notion, which requires that anything that can be done by an attacker in
possession of the obfuscated code can also be done by a simulator who can only run the software
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in a “black box," with no access to intermediary values or other properties of the computation
between input ingestion and output production. This notion would be suitable for virtually1 all
possible applications of obfuscation, but it is shown in [37] that it is impossible to achieve for
general functionalities. The notion of IO requires something weaker, merely that an attacker in
possession of two different obfuscations of the same functionality cannot tell them apart. In other
words, we only enforce indistinguishability for program descriptions that may differ internally but
whose external input/output behavior is identical.
At the time of its introduction by [37], IO was neither shown to be impossible, nor shown to be
particularly useful. Progress instead was made for VBB obfuscation of very basic functionalities,
such as point obfuscation [38, 39] and hyperplane membership [40], which lie below the reach of
the impossibility result for VBB. But following the unprecedented construction of cryptographic
multilinear maps in [41], two breakthroughs occurred in quick succession. A first candidate con-
struction for indistinguishability obfuscation of general functions was proposed in [42], and the
flexible technique of “punctured programming" was developed for deriving meaningful crypto-
graphic results from the IO security guarantee [43].
Since then, the cryptographic research community has been riding out wave of positive and
negative results: increasingly powerful constructions employing idealized models on multilinear
maps or new, complex assumptions
[42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54], attacks on the underlying multilinear maps [55, 56,
57, 58, 59, 60], and a steady stream of works deriving applications and consequences from various
forms of obfuscation(e.g., [61, 62, 63], and many more).
Our work is focused on the goal of obfuscating a modest but well-motivated functionality, one
that does not require the use of multilinear maps, and hence does not inherit the risks of their still
volatile security assumptions or the inefficiency that currently comes with using such a general-
purpose tool. We consider the problem of pattern matching with wildcards: suppose there is an
input binary string S of length n, and a pattern specification P also of length n, where for each bit
1Pun intended
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P either dictates a particular bit value, or has a wildcard ∗, indicating that either value is allowed.
For example, with n = 5, a pattern P would look like: 00∗ 11, and there would be two “matching"
input strings S in this case, 00011 and 00111. The function we will obfuscate is the final “yes" or
“no" outcome: for each P , we define the associated function fP (S) that outputs 1 when S matches
P and outputs 0 otherwise.
This kind of functionality might appear, for instance, in a context like software patching. If
a pattern P represents a problematic type of user input, say, that needs to be filtered out, we
can obfuscate this function fP to reject bad inputs without unnecessarily revealing P in full and
helping attackers learn how to design such bad inputs. If the input length n is reasonably long
and the number of matches to the pattern is not too dense in the space of inputs, we can hope
that an attacker who queries a polynomial number of input strings will never manage to find a
“bad" input that matches the pattern. We find these situations (where the adversary does not have
enough information to identify the function being obfuscated) to be the most compelling subset of
the standard VBB obfuscation security guarantee (as opposed to the subset involving simulating
an adversary that already knows the function being obfuscated). Accordingly, we demonstrate
that our construction satisfies a distributional security notion from [64, 65, 66]: if the pattern P is
chosen from a suitable random distribution (and the number of wildcards w ≤ 0.75n), then a PPT
attacker will not be able to distinguish our obfuscation of fP from an obfuscation of a function that
always outputs 0.
Our construction uses only the basic tools of group operations and polynomial interpolation,
and so is quite efficient. Our security analysis will be in the generic group model, for a regular
cyclic group, with no multilinearity required. It remains an interesting open problem to obtain a
security analysis in the standard model, using standard assumptions like DDH, for instance. [67]
showed that the easier problem of bounded Hamming distance decoding is at least as hard as the
DDH problem. While the result is not applicable to the obfuscation construction, the intermedi-
ary problem of finding nontrivial representations of the identity element first described by [68] is
potentially applicable.
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The functionality of pattern matching with wildcards has been previously obfuscated in [64,
65]. These constructions rely on multiplicative encoding schemes that enable multiplication of the
encoded values and also zero-testing, i.e. checking whether an encoded value is zero. Unlike mul-
tilinear maps, these encoding schemes do not need to have additive properties. This functionality
has been realized either through the use of general multilinear maps [64] or through lattice-based
encodings relying on a new instance dependent assumption called entropic LWE [65]. A recent
work by Wichs and Zirdelis [66] provides an obfuscation construction for a more general high
entropy class, called compute-and-compare functions, from LWE. This class includes our pattern
matching with wildcards. We view our construction as a simple and highly efficient alternative to
such an LWE-based construction, and this is in line with the long tradition of analogous function-
alities being achieved in the discrete-logarithm and LWE regimes.
To keep our scheme as intuitive and as efficient as possible, we start from additive basics. Let’s
first consider a pattern P with no wildcards. In this case, our function fP is just a point function,
since there is only one input string that matches the fully prescriptive pattern. Here we can work
over Zp and choose uniformly random values a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ Zp and set an = −(a1 + · · ·+ an−1).
We can choose additional random values r1, . . . , rn ∈ Zp. Now our obfuscated program can be
comprised of 2n elements of Zp, which we will label as xi,b where i ∈ [n] and b ∈ [0, 1]. For
each input bit position i, if the pattern value P is b, we set xi,b := ai and xi,1−b = ri. To evaluate
the obfuscated program on an input string, the evaluator simply selects the value corresponding
to each input bit, and takes the sum modulo p. If it is 0, the output is 1. Otherwise the output is
0. Given these 2n values, if an attacker wants to find the pattern P , they are essentially trying to
solve the subset sum problem (this is a slight variant since we have this kind of pair structure on
the elements, but still the security intuition is the same).
Now if we want to introduce wildcards, it is clear we cannot simply give out ai for both values
for input bit i, since this will be noticed. The next thing we might try is to choose a random
polynomial F of degree n over Zp whose constant term is 0. Now we can set xi,b = F (2i+ b) for
positions that match the pattern, including both values of b in a wildcard position i. Our desired
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functionality can now be evaluated through polynomial interpolation. However, we quickly start
to run into attacks based on list-decoding or regular decoding of Reed-Solomon codes, which can
enable an attacker to recover the polynomial F once there are enough valid evaluations due to the
wild cards.
A key observation at this point is that these decoding-style attacks rely upon non-linear func-
tions of the given values, while the honest evaluation of the intended program needs only linear
operations. This allows us to place the values xi,b in the exponent of a group G = 〈g〉 where
discrete-log is difficult, and give out gxi,b instead. This stops the decoding attacks without pre-
venting honest evaluations. In the generic group model, the attacker is essentially limited to linear
functions of the given exponents, so we can indeed formalize this intuition and obtain a security
proof.
The hardness of noisy polynomial interpolation in the exponent was previously analyzed by [67],
who gave a generic group argument concerning the problem of interpolating a polynomial with a
slightly different error distribution. Our work follows a similar idea, but the specific wildcard
structure we employ for our application creates some subtle differences, so we give a full argu-
ment here for completeness. We also provide a more rigorous exposition of the generic group
proof argument.
It is an interesting problem to prove security for such a scheme without resorting to a generic
group analysis. It seems that we should need a computational assumption like subset sum to assert
that even though the group operations allow a discovery of the hidden structure, it is too sparse
inside a combinatorially large space of possible input evaluations to be efficiently found. It also
seems that we should need a computational assumption like DDH to explain exactly how the group
blocks non-linear attacks. However, assumptions like DDH allow us to hide structure that is al-
ready non-linear, but requires us to preserve any structure that is linear, since linear structure on
any small number of group elements can be discovered by brute force by an attacker. We could try
to formulate some new assumption that is a strengthening of the subset sum assumption to the kind
of intertwined linear structures that arise from polynomial evaluation, but this doesn’t yet seem to
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yield insight beyond asserting security of the scheme itself. We would ideally like to see a hybrid
argument that combined simple subset-sum like steps with simple DDH-like steps, but designing
such a reduction remains an intriguing challenge. Given that LWE-based approaches in the stan-
dard model are known, this represents a new test case on the boundary of the analogies we know
between DDH-hard groups and the LWE setting. We expect that further study of this disconnect
in proof technology between the LWE setting and the DDH setting may yield general insights into
the inherent relationships (or lack thereof) between these different mathematical underpinnings.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.a The generic group model
We will prove the security of our construction against generic adversaries, which interact with
group elements via the generic group model as defined in [69]. In this model, an adversary can
only interact with the group via oracle calls to its group operation and zero test functionality.
Group elements are represented by “handles," which are uniformly random strings long enough
that the small probability of collision between handles representing different group elements can
be ignored. A generic group operation oracle takes as input two group handles and returns a new
handle representing the group element that is the result of the group operation on the two inputs
(and is consistent with all handles previously used). Note that such an oracle can be efficiently
simulated using a lookup table.
We use G to denote such a generic group operation oracle that answers adversary calls. AG will
denote an adversary given access to this oracle and OG will denote the set of handles generated by
G corresponding to the group elements in the construction O.
3.2.b Distributional virtual black-box obfuscation in the generic group model
We will use a definition of distributional virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation in the generic
group model which is essentially the definition of [64], except using the generic group model
instead of the random graded encoding model:
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Definition 6 (Distributional VBB Obfuscator). Let C = {Cn}n∈N be a family of polynomial-size
circuits, where Cn is a set of boolean circuits operating on inputs of length n, and let O be a ppt
algorithm which takes as input an input length n ∈ N and a circuit C ∈ C and outputs a boolean
circuit O(C) (not necessarily in C). Let D = {Dn}n∈N be an ensemble of distribution families Dn
where each D ∈ Dn is a distribution over Cn.
O is a distributional VBB obfuscator for the distribution class D over the circuit family C if it
has the following properties:
1. Functionality-Preserving: For every n ∈ N, C ∈ Cn, and ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, with all but negl(n)
probability over the coins of O:
(O(C, 1n)(~x) = C(~x)
2. Polynomial Slowdown: For every n ∈ N and C ∈ Cn, the evaluation of O(C, 1n) can be
performed in time poly(|C|, n).
3. Distributional Virtual Black-Box in Generic Group Model: For every polynomial (in n) time
generic adversary A, there exists a polynomial time simulator S, such that for every n ∈ N,
every distribution D ∈ Dn (a distribution over Cn, and every predicate P : Cn → {0, 1}:
|PrC←Dn,G,OG ,A[AG(OG(C, 1n)) = P (C)]−PrC←Dn,S [SC(1|C|, 1n) = P (C)]| = negl(n)
Remark 7. As in [64], we remark that a stronger notion of functionality-preserving exists in the
literature, where the obfuscated program must agree with C(~x) on all inputs ~x simultaneously. We
use the relaxed requirement that for every input (individually), the obfuscated circuit is correct
except for negligible probability. We also note that our construction can be modified to achieve the
stronger property by using a group of sufficiently large size (22n) and the union bound over each
of the 2n inputs.
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Schwartz-Zippel Lemma
A key step in our hybrid proof of security relies on the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, which we will
reproduce here:
Lemma 3.2.1. Let Zp be a finite field of size p and let P ∈ Zp[x1, . . . , xn] be a non-zero polynomial
of degree ≤ d. Let r1, ..., rn be selected at random independently and uniformly from Zp. Then:
Pr[P (r1, ..., rn) = 0] ≤ dp .
3.3 Obfuscating pattern matching with wildcards
The class of functions for pattern matching with wildcards is parametrized by (n, ~y,W), where
W ⊂ [n] is an index set and f~y : {0, 1}n−|W| −→ {0, 1} is a point function over n − |W| input
variables that outputs 1 on the single input ~y ∈ {0, 1}n−|W|. The function ΠWc : {0, 1}n −→
{0, 1}n−|W| projects a boolean vector of length n onto only the entries not in the index set W .





Our obfuscation scheme for the class of functions for pattern matching with wildcards is as follows:
Setup(n): sample a1, · · · , an−1 ∼ Zp uniformly at random and construct the fixed polynomial
F (x) := a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ an−1xn−1. Let G be a group with generator g of prime order p > 2n.
Construction(n, ~y,W): the obfuscator outputs 2n elements arranged in a 2 × n table of n
columns corresponding to the n input variables with two entries each corresponding to the two
possible boolean values of each input. For each slot hij where (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}, if either
i ∈ W or yi = j, then the obfuscator releases the element hij = gF (2i+j). Otherwise, the obfuscator
releases hij as a uniformly random element of G.





2i− xi − xj + 2j
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Output 1 if T = g0 and 0 otherwise.
Functionality-Preserving: The fact that this obfuscation scheme is functionality-preserving
follows from the fact that, if ~x is an accepting input of f (f(~x) = 1), then the chosen handles form
n proper evaluations of the polynomial F (x) on distinct elements. Further, the Ci scalars used in
evaluation are Lagrange coefficients, making the evaluation a polynomial interpolation that returns













On the other hand, if even one input bit was not accepting (so f(~x) = 0), then at least one of
the hixi’s used in interpolation would be a uniformly random group element (not g
F (2i+j)). Thus,
the evaluation product would be a product that includes a uniformly random group element raised
to some power, which would result in T = g0 with negligible probability 1
p
.
Polynomial Slowdown: Given a the set of 2n group elements, assuming group operations can
be performed in poly(n) time, the computation of Ci and T described in the Evaluation procedure
can be performed in polynomial time.
Distributional Virtual Black-Box: We give a proof of our construction’s distributional VBB
security in the generic group model in Section 3.4 in Theorem 14.
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3.4 Distributional VBB security in the generic group model
This section will prove Theorem 14, which establishes the distributional virtual black box
security of our construction in the generic group model over the class of uniform distributions for
point functions with wildcards. Our framework for reasoning in the generic group setting draws
from [69].
The security proof shows that the obfuscation scheme constructed for a specific pattern match-
ing with wildcards function f~y,W is indistinguishable from an obfuscation where all hij are random
group elements. The analysis involves analyzing the performance of an adversary interacting with
three different implementations of the generic group oracle. The first of these oracles operates
according to an honest instantiation of the construction, while the third oracle operates according
to an ideal instantiation where each group element is drawn from a uniformly random distribution.
Given that a low probability failure event does not occur, any algorithm’s behavior when inter-
acting with either of these oracles should be identical. The actual calculation of the probability of
such a failure event is conceptually simple and done by many previous works for different noise
distributions. On the other hand, properly formalizing the notion of "identical behavior" is where
most of our new technical machinery is introduced.
In order to rigorously reason about the space of handles in a generic proof, we define an equiv-
alent security game where an adversary calls two oracles simultaneously, one of whose behavior is
already completely known. The purpose of incorporating a known oracle into the security game is
to rigorously define when the unknown oracle deviates from expected behavior, and thus, when the
adversary has distinguishing power. We make use of basic tools from category theory in order to
describe the space of handles that the adversary has access to and when these handle sets become
distinguishable.
In a generic group proof, there are many closely related but technically distinct kinds of objects
that are often conflated. There are the underlying group elements, which can be associated with
their exponents in Zp relative to the common base. There are the handles that the group oracle
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associates to these elements. There are formal polynomials which may track known or unknown
relationships between group elements. There are subsets of handles which the adversary has pre-
viously seen, and other handles whose distribution remains independent of the adversary’s view so
far. In order to make our proof as rigorous and precise as possible, we will keep explicit track of
all of these various objects, and the maps between them.
We define an equivalent security game where an adversary calls two oracles simultaneously,
one of whose behavior is already completely known. The purpose of incorporating a known oracle
into the security game is to rigorously define when the unknown oracle deviates from expected
behavior, and thus, when the adversary has distinguishing power. Given that a low probability
failure event does not occur, any algorithm’s behavior when interacting with either of these oracles
should be identical. The actual calculation of the probability of such a failure event is conceptually
simple and done by many previous works for different noise distributions. On the other hand, in
order to properly describe the notion of "identical behavior" we introduce some basic technical
machinery from category theory.
We establish some notation before proceeding. Let bold letters denote symbolic variables
and non-bold letters denote the sampled random values for the corresponding variable. Let f ∈
Zp[a1, · · · , an, x] be a fixed polynomial of degree n− 1 in x which is linear in each ai individually.
Let HS and HM be two identical copies of the same space of strings corresponding to handles in
the generic group model.
Since our proof takes place in the generic group model, and our obfuscated program consists
of a set of group elements, we will use the notation GS,GM ,GE to denote three different ways that
an adversary can be supplied with handles representing an obfuscated program and how requests
to the generic group operation oracle are answered. GS will implement faithful interaction with the
true construction in the generic group model. GM implements a hybrid setting that we will show is
indistinguishable from GS to the adversary. Finally, GE implements a setting that can be simulated
without knowledge of the function drawn from the distribution (and is indistinguishable from GM ).
The high level structure of our proof is pretty typical for a generic group argument. The group
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oracle GM will behave similarly to GS , but instead of sampling random exponents according to the
proscribed polynomial structure, it will work with formal polynomials representing this structure,
hence ignoring any spurious relationship arises from a particular choice at the sampling stage.
Arguing that GS and GM are indistinguishable is where we use the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma. An
adversary will only receive a different distribution of handles if it manages to find a spurious
relationship while interacting with GS , which must mean that the sampling happened to choose a
root of a non-trivial, low degree formal polynomial. The Schwartz-Zippel Lemma allows us to
conclude that this will occur with only negligible probability over the sampling employed by GS .
To argue that GM and GE are indistinguishable, we will need to argue that the adversary can-
not (except with negligible probability), detect the remaining formal polynomial structure in GM ,
since doing so requires referencing many correctly structured elements and avoiding the random el-
ements completely. As long as the wildcards are not too dense, this is an intractable combinatorial
problem for the adversary.
Definition 8 (GS: Oracle Start).
First, sample the following uniformly at random:
• W = {i1, · · · , iw} ⊂ [n]
• yi ∈ {0, 1} for each i 6∈ W
• a1, · · · , an ∈ Zp
• Random embedding ΦS : G ↪→ HS
For the initial set of handles representing the 2n group elements in the obfuscation of f~y,W , for
each entry (i, j) ∈ [n]× {0, 1}:




• Otherwise sample a uniformly random exponent ρij and output ΦS(gρij)
Given a group operation query on (h1, h2):
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• Find g1 = Φ−1S (h1) and g2 = Φ
−1
S (h2). If either does not exist, ignore the query.
• Return ΦS(g1 · g2)
Note that GS faithfully instantiates our construction described in Section 3.3 in the generic
group model. We will now describe an alternative oracle implementation that uses symbolic vari-
ables instead of group elements to produce the generic group functionality:
Definition 9 (GM : Oracle Middle).
First, sample the following uniformly at random:
• W = {i1, · · · , iw} ⊂ [n]
• yi ∈ {0, 1} for each i 6∈ W
• Random embedding ΦM : Zp[a1, · · · , an,b1, · · · ,bn−w] ↪→ HM .
Let σ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1} → [n− w] be an arbitrary ordering of the (n− w) coordinate pairs (i, j)
where i 6∈ W and j 6= yi, and which is not defined on the other coordinate pairs.
For the initial set of handles representing the 2n group elements in the obfuscation of f~y,W , for
each entry (i, j) ∈ [n]× {0, 1}:
• If i ∈ W or yi = j (i.e. the input bit is part of an accepting string), output ΦM(F (a1, · · · , an, 2i+
j))
• Otherwise output the label ΦM(bσ(ij))
Given a group operation query on (h1, h2):
• Find p1 = Φ−1M (h1) and p2 = Φ
−1
M (h2). If either does not exist, ignore the query.
• Return ΦM(p1 + p2)
The two oracles are related by the existence of the following evaluation map in the exponent:
φ : Z[a1, · · · , an,b1, · · · ,bn−w] −→ G
F (a1, · · · , an, an,b1, · · · ,bn−w) 7−→ gF (a1,··· ,an,b1,··· ,bn−w)
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where bk = ρσ−1(k) are the values of the random exponents sampled by Oracle S for the
non-accepting slots. Only the existence of this evaluation map is necessary for the proof, so its
dependence on unknown random values is not an issue.
In particular φ is a surjective group homomorphism of
(
Zp[a1, · · · , an,b1, · · · ,bn−w],+
)
into
(G,×), since it is a composition of an evaluation map with an exponential map, which are both
surjective group homomorphisms.
The idea behind defining such an evaluation map is to define the failure event as a substructure
of a larger structure which may then be used to formalize when the behavior is identical. In
particular, we will see that the failure event corresponds to the kernel of this evaluation map that
we just defined.
3.4.a Simultaneous oracle game
Rather than proving that the difference in any adversary’s output probabilities when interacting
with (GS vs. GM) or (GM vs. GE) is small directly, we will define another security game and exhibit
a reduction to the desired statements. In this new security game, the adversary simultaneously
queries two oracles for operations on group elements: one oracle GM is known and serves as a
convenience for formalizing the generic group oracle, and the second G∗ is the unknown that the
adversary wishes to identify. We define the game with oracles (GS,GM) below and note that the
game and reduction for oracles (GM ,GE) is symmetric.
Definition 10 (Simultaneous Oracle Game). An adversary is given access to a pair of oracles
(GM ,G∗), where G∗ is GM with probability 1/2 and GS with probability 1/2. In each round, the
adversary asks the same query to both oracles. The adversary wins the game if he guesses correctly
the identity of G∗.
To make precise the notion of an adversary playing both oracles simultaneously and asking the
same queries, the adversary maintains two setsHtS andHtM which are the sets of handles returned
by the oracles after t query rounds. The adversary then maintains a function Ψ : HtM → HtS .
Initially, the adversary sets Ψ(hbij) = h
a
ij for each initial slot location (i, j) ∈ {1, n} × {0, 1},
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where haij is the handle corresponding to the slot (i, j) in oracles S and h
b
ij the handle in oracles
M . After each query hm = GM(hb1, hb2) and hs = GS(Ψ(hb1),Ψ(hb2)) the adversary updates the
function with the definition Ψ(hs) = hm.
Lemma 3.4.1. Suppose there exists an algorithm A such that
∣∣∣Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]− Pr[AGS(OGS) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ δ





pair of oracles (GM ,G∗ = GM/GS).
Proof. Let p = Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1] and q = Pr[AGS(OGS) = 1]. The adversary can estimate
these parameters to within a bounded polynomial of the true parameter by simulating each oracle
and A’s behavior on each.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that p ≥ q. Otherwise, we can define p, q to be the
inverse quantities Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 0],Pr[AGS(OGS) = 0] respectively.
The adversary will guess G∗ = GM if AG∗(OG∗) = 1 and G∗ = GS if AG∗(OG∗) = 0. The
probability of success is given by
Pr[AG∗(OG∗) = G∗] = Pr[G∗ = GM ] Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]













3.4.b Indistinguishability between Start and Middle
The following gives a criteria for overall indistinguishability of the output handle distributions.
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Definition 11. The pair (hs, hm) of answers returned by (GS,GM) after query number t is called
identical if it satisfies one of the following:
1. hs 6∈ HtS and hm 6∈ HtM
2. The oracles return handles hs ∈ HS, hm ∈ HM respectively such that Ψ(hm) = hs
Note that in case (1), hs and hm are both freshly sampled uniformly random strings and their
distributions are equal.
Lemma 3.4.2. In the simultaneous oracle game with G∗ = GS , suppose for every query (hm1 , hm2 )
to oracle M and corresponding query (Ψ(hm1 ),Ψ(h
m
2 )) to oracle S, the answers returned are
identical. Then for any algorithm A, we have
Pr[AGS(OGS) = 1] = Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2. If we had swapped the oracles GS and GM and the adversary had used Ψ−1
instead of Ψ, the answer distributions would have been identical and A would have to produce the
same output distribution.
Remark 12. Note that this argument does not depend on the particular implementations of GS,GM ,
and therefore the lemma also holds for the pair of oracles GM ,GE (to be defined later in Defini-
tion 13).
Thus it suffices to show that





hmt = GM(hmt1, hmt2)
}Q
t=1
Then with overall probability at least 1− (Q+ 2n)
2
p
, for every t, hst and h
m
t are identical as defined
in Definition 11.
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Proof. Initially each set of 2n handles given by each oracle are uniformly random strings and
hence indistinguishable. The proof is by induction under the following hypothesis:
Suppose the adversary has made t queries so far and hasHtS,HtM satisfying the following:
1. For each query made so far, the answer distributions have been identical.
2. For every hs ∈ HtS , there exists a unique f ∈ Zp[a1, · · · , an] such that ΦS ◦ φ(f) = Φ−1M (f)
We can state this inductive hypothesis this in the following commutative diagram:







Here Im(ΦM), Im(ΦS) are the relevant handles in the handle spaces. Commutativity of the
lower triangle under the unique lift means that for all hs ∈ HtS,∃!f ∈ Zp[~x] such that iS(hs) =
ΦS ◦φ(f). Note that the upper triangle trivially commutes because the unique lift is defined by the
composition ΦM ◦ iM ◦Ψ−1. To ease the notation a little, we’ll omit the inclusion maps from here
on when it is obvious the handle is inHt∗.
Now assuming the inductive hypothesis, suppose the (t + 1)th query is the group operation of
h1, h2 ∈ HtM and Ψ(h1),Ψ(h2) ∈ HtS . Oracle M will output the handle
hm = ΦM
(




=: h1 · h2,
and Oracle S will output the handle
hs = ΦS
(
Φ−1S (Ψ(h1))× Φ−1S (Ψ(h2))
)
=: Ψ(h1) ·Ψ(h2).
The (·) notation on handles is justified by the fact that Im(ΦM) ⊂ HM is trivially isomomorphic
as a group to Zp[a1, · · · , an], where its group operation is obtained by pulling back by ΦM , and
likewise for Im(ΦS) ⊂ HS .
We have the following two cases:
49
1. hm ∈ HtM (i.e. this handle was seen previously). Then
Ψ(h1) ·Ψ(h2) = (ΦS ◦ φ ◦ Φ−1M )(h1) · (ΦS ◦ φ ◦ Φ−1M )(h2)
= (ΦS ◦ φ ◦ Φ−1M )(h1 · h2)
= (ΦS ◦ φ ◦ Φ−1M )(hm)
= Ψ(hm)
where we use commutativity of the diagram on each factor handle, the homomorphism prop-
erty of the maps, the definition of oracle M ’s output, and commutativity of the diagram on
the output handle (which we can do since the handle was previously defined).
Thus the handles in the output pair have the same distribution, and since no new handles are
created, the inductive hypothesis trivially remains satisfied.
2. hm 6∈ HtM (i.e. this is a new handle).
(a) If hs 6∈ HtS is also a new handle, then the unique lift simply extends to map hs to
Φ−1M (h
m), and both HtM and HtS are augmented by one element. The handles in the
output pair are new and uniformly distributed, and the inductive hypothesis is satisfied.
(b) If hs ∈ HtS , then by the inductive hypothesis, hs lifts to some fs ∈ Zp[~x] which maps
to some h˜b = Ψ−1(hs). However we also have fm = Φ−1M (h
m) 6= fs, since hm 6∈ HtM .
Thus both fs and fm are lifts of hs which make the diagram commute, so after this
query the inductive hypothesis is no longer satisfied for the next query.
This event only happens if fs− fm ∈ kerφ and fs− fm is nontrivial. Thus the proof is
complete as long as we show this event happens with low probability.
Now consider the following sequential variant of the game. The adversary plays the game using
the real Oracle M and his own simulation of Oracle S obtained by outputting a uniformly random
string when GM does and using the Ψ map when GM outputs an existing string. He then plays the
exact same sequence to the real Oracle S and compares these answers to the ones produced by
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the real Oracle M . As long as the bad event does not occur, the sequence of queries asked in this
sequential game is identical to the sequence of queries asked playing the real pair of oracles.
The occurrence of the bad event is decided by the initial random sampling of a1, · · · , an ∈ Zp,
and thus the bad event either occurs in both the sequential and parallel variants or in neither. So it
suffices to just bound the probability of the bad event occurring at any time in the sequential game.
For each pair (fs, fm), fs − fm is a degree-1 polynomial in n variables over Zp. Thus the bad
event happens with probability at most 1
p
by Lemma 3.2.1, the Schwartz-Zippel lemma. Thus by a
union bound, after Q queries of either type, there are at most (Q+ 2n)2 pairs of symbolic polyno-
mials, so with probability at most (Q+2n)
2
p
the two distributions of handles are distinguishable.
We remark that everything in the proof only relied on diagram arguments and did not care
about the actual structure of the underlying objects, except for analyzing when fs − fm ∈ kerφ
occurred. Thus in the proceeding reductions between other oracles, all this automatically follows
provided we can define an appropriate evaluation map φ, and we only need to analyze the kernel
of the corresponding evaluation map.
Lemma 3.4.4. For an adversary A in the generic group model which makes Q queries to the
generic group oracle,




where the probability is taken over the distribution C ← Dn,GS,O,A
Proof. From Lemma 3.4.2 we have that:
Pr[AGS(OGS) = 1] = Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]
as long as all queries to the generic group oracles are identical as defined in Definition 11.
Lemma 3.4.3 tells us that the probabilities of all queries not being identical during the si-
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multaneous oracle game between (GS,GM) is at most (Q+ 2n)
2
p
, where Q is the number of the
adversary’s queries to the generic group oracle and p > 2n is the order of the group.




so an adversary’s advantage in the simultaneous oracle game between (GM ,GS) and (GM ,GM) is:
Pr[AG∗(OG∗) = G∗] = Pr[G∗ = GM ] Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]













This, plugged into the reduction from Lemma 3.4.1, tells us that for all adversaries:
∣∣∣Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]− Pr[AGS(OGS) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ (Q+ 2n)2
2n
3.4.c Game between Middle and End
Definition 13 (GE: Oracle End).
First, sample the following uniformly at random:
• Random embedding ΦE : Zp[c1, · · · , c2n] ↪→ HE .
For the initial set of handles representing the 2n group elements in the obfuscation of f~y,W , for
each entry (i, j) ∈ [n]× {0, 1}:
• Output ΦE(c2i+j)
Given a group operation query on (h1, h2):
• Find p1 = Φ−1E (h1) and p2 = Φ
−1
E (h2). If either does not exist, ignore the query.
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• Return ΦE(p1 + p2)
Oracle M and Oracle E are related by the following evaluation map which is defined on the
generators of Zp[c1, · · · , c2n] and extended by linearity.
φ : Zp[c1, · · · , c2n] −→ Zp[a1, · · · , an,b1, · · · ,bn−w]
ck 7−→ bσ(bk/2c,k mod 2) if σ is defined here
ck 7−→ F (a1, · · · , an, k) otherwise
In other words the monomial ck is mapped to the same symbolic polynomial that Oracle Middle
assigned to the slot
(bk/2c, k mod 2), which is either a symbolic variable b or a symbolic poly-
nomial F (a1, · · · , an, k). Since the ck’s generate the entire additive group Zp[c1, · · · , c2n], this ex-
tends to a group homomorphism of
(




Zp[a1, · · · , an,b1, · · · ,bn−w],+
)
.





het = GM(het1, het2)
}Q
t=1
If w/n ≤ 3/4, then with overall probability at least 1− 2
20.0613n
for every t, hst and h
m
t are identical
as defined in Definition 11.
The proof of this lemma starts with the same setup as the proof of 3.4.3. The adversary main-
tains a function Ψ : HE → HM and two sets of handlesHtE,HtM .
Proof. Inductively, after t queries, assume the following commutative diagram is true:
Zp[c1, · · · , · · · , c2n] Im(ΦE) HtE







The same diagram chase from the proof of (3.4.3) tells us that the next pair of query answers
(he, hm) only fails to satisfy the inductive hypothesis if hm lifts to fm ∈ Zp[~c] by the inductive
hypothesis, butfm 6= Φ−1E (he) =: fe, so fm − fe ∈ kerφ and fm − fe is nontrivial. Necessary but
not sufficient conditions for fm − fe to be in the kernel of φ are:
1. fm− fe must have a zero coefficient in front of any ck that is defined under the σ map, since
each free variable bj has a unique preimage.
2. fm − fe must have at least n− 1 nonzero coefficients
As with the proof of (3.4.3), we analyze the sequential variant where the adversary plays a
sequence of queries to GE and then plays the exact same sequence of queries to GM . AfterQ queries
the adversary has at most Q + 2n symbolic polynomials in Zp[~c]. For each pair of polynomials
fm, fe in this set, the variables ck are mapped by the initial random sampling of the wildcard slots
by Oracle M .
Now suppose the adversary fixes a polynomial containing n−1 nonzero coefficients of the ck’s
such that m columns in the original table of 2n entries have nonzero coefficients for both entries in
the column. This means that the oracle must necessarily choose those m columns to be wildcard
slots, since otherwise one of the two entries in the column will not be in the kernel of the φ map.
This means that the probability over the initialization of the oracle that these m columns are all




. The remaining n− 1− 2m columns each must either match
the entry chosen by the adversary or be a wildcard slot. There are (n − 1 − 2m) − (w − m) =
(n − 1 − w) − m slots that cannot be wildcard slots and thus have at most probability 1/2 each
of matching the entry chosen by the adversary. Thus the probability that this polynomial is in the













An upper bound for this can be computed by maximizing the expression with respect to the
adversary’s choice of m. If we increment m by 1, the first factor is multiplied by w−m
n−m while
the second factor is multiplied by 2. Note that w−m
n−m is monotonically decreasing in m; thus, this
quantity is maximized when m is the largest possible integer such that w−m
n−m > 1/2 is still true.
Note that when w < n/2, then the optimal choice is m = 0. Assuming w > n/2 and solving for
this inequality we obtain that m = 2w − n. Now the problem also has a physical constraint that
m ≤ n/2 since the adversary can choose at most n/2 slots. Thus there are three parameter regimes
based on α:
1. α ≤ n/2: the optimal choice is m = 0
2. n/2 ≤ α ≤ 3n/4: the optimal choice is m = 2w − n
3. n > 3n/4: the optimal choice is m = n/2
In case 1, the probability is then clearly bounded by (1/2)n−1−w.



































We can absorb the factors of
√
2pi and e in front into a small constant term less than 2. Note
that since each factorial is a constant multiple of n, then the
√
k term also yields a constant term,














Taking log2 we obtain (1 − α) log2(1 − α) + α log2 α + α ≤ −0.0613 when α ≤ 3/4, so the
probability of success is bounded by 2
20.0613n
.



























The base of the exponent is
[n/e]1/2+α−1−(α−1/2)[α]α[α− 1/2](1/2−α)2α−1 = αα(α− 1/2)1/2−α2α−1
Again taking log2 we obtain the condition (1/2 − α) log2(α − 1/2) + α logα + α − 1 < 0,
which is satisfied when α < 0.774. This does not give much of an improvement over the previous
constraint of α ≤ 3/4, so we state our final result just in that regime.
Apply a union bound of this probability over all (Q + 2n)2 pairs of symbolic polynomials to
get the statement in the theorem.
Lemma 3.4.6. For an adversary A in the generic group model which makes Q queries to the
generic group oracle,
|PrC←Dn,GM ,O,A[AGM (OGM (C, 1n)) = P (C)]−PrC←Dn,GEO,A[AGE(OGE(C, 1n)) = P (C)]
≤ 1
20.0613n
Proof. Uses Lemmas 3.4.2 (recalling that the statement also holds for the pair GM ,GE) and 3.4.5
plugged into the reduction from Lemma 3.4.1.
From Lemma 3.4.2 (recalling that the statement also holds for the pair GM ,GS) we have that:
Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1] = Pr[AGE(OGE) = 1]
as long as all queries to the generic group oracles are identical as defined in Definition 11.
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Lemma 3.4.3 tells us that the probabilities of all queries not being identical during the simulta-
neous oracle game between (GM ,GE) is at most 220.0613n .
Therefore, the difference Pr[AGE(OGE) = 1]−Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1] is at most 2
20.0613n
, and so
an adversary’s advantage in the simultaneous oracle game between (GM ,GE) and (GM ,GM) is:
Pr[AG∗(OG∗) = G∗] = Pr[G∗ = GE] Pr[AGE(OGE) = 1]













This, plugged into the reduction from Lemma 3.4.1, tells us that for all adversaries:
∣∣∣Pr[AGM (OGM ) = 1]− Pr[AGE(OGE) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ 1
20.0613n
Theorem 14. The obfuscator for pattern matching with wildcards defined in Section 3.3 satisfies
distributional VBB security for the ensemble of uniform distributions over {0, 1}n.
Proof. For any adversaryA in the Distributional VBB game (in the generic group model), consider
the following Simulator S which simply runs A on input produced by and interacted with like in
Oracle End and outputs the same. Note that none of the behavior in Oracle End is dependent on the
actual function f~y,W obfuscated. Therefore a simulator with no access to the function f~y,W drawn
from the distribution is able to simulate A as described.
S then perfectly simulates the behavior of A interacting with oracle OE:
PrC←Dn,S [SC(1|C|, 1n) = P (C)] = PrC←Dn,GE ,O,A[AGE(OGE(C, 1n)) = P (C)]
From Lemma 3.4.6, we have that the difference in output probabilities betweenAGE(OGE) and
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AGM (OGM ) in the distributional VBB game in the generic group model is at most 1
20.0613n
:
|PrC [AGE(OGE(C, 1n)) = P (C)]−PrC [AGM (OGM (C, 1n)) = P (C)]| ≤ 1
20.0613n
From Lemma 3.4.4, we have that the difference in output probabilities between AGM (OGM )




|PrC [AGM (OGM (C, 1n)) = P (C)]−PrC [AGS(OGS(C, 1n)) = P (C)]| ≤ (Q+ 2n)
2
2n
Now, recall that GS faithfully instantiates O in the generic group model. Therefore, using the
triangle inquality we have:








since the number of an adversary’s generic group queries Q is a polynomial function of n and so
O satisfies distributional VBB security in the generic group model.
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Chapter 4: Non-statistical algorithms in machine learning
Modern machine learning is primarily based on the statistical convergence properties of stochas-
tic gradient descent and its variations. However, empirically it has been observed that stochastic
gradient descent exhibits optimization bias which is not reflected in the scalar loss objective func-
tion itself. This has led to research and discussion on whether sharpness or flatness of the Hessian
near the solution is a desirable property for generalization [70]. In this chapter, we first investi-
gate this bias mathematically using nonisotropic stochastic differential equations. We show that
stochastic gradient descent has an optimization bias which arises from the nonconstant covariance
term, resulting in convergence to a stationary point different from the local minima of the scalar
objective function itself.
We then investigate alternative approaches to solving parameter recovery problems which are
not rooted in statistical loss minimization. Our goal is to construct provable algorithms for non-
convex optimization problems which were previously solved using iterative methods such as EM.
These techniques avoid issues with non-statistical optimization biases of the stochastic gradient
descent algorithm. We demonstrate the use of Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz lattice basis reduction algo-
rithm for solving two discrete parameter recovery problems. This work was previously published
in [6] and [7] and demonstrates the value of cryptanalysis tools for solving certain types of machine
learning problems.
4.1 Analysis of bias in stochastic optimization
Empirical studies have shown that the solutions returned by stochastic gradient descent seem
to exhibit additional properties not explicitly present in the objective function itself. SGD seems
to concentrate around minima where the spectrum of the Hessian is sparse [71], and thus the
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minima is "flat" in most directions. There is some evidence to suggest these flat minima lead to
better generalization performance, and modifications of stochastic gradient descent designed to
explicitly maximize flatness have been studied empirically [72].
[73] introduced a framework for modeling the stochastic gradient descent algorithm as a continuous-
time stochastic differential equation. Following that there has been a steady stream of work
trying to glean insight in the behavior of stochastic gradient descent from this diffusion frame-
work [74][75]. However these papers make the simplifying assumption that the diffusion matrix
is isotropic (a scalar multiple of the identity), and the behavior of the diffusion process with a
nonconstant, nonisotropic matrix is far more interesting, albeit mathematically challenging.
The physics community has been trying to understand the stationary behavior of such processes
for a long time, and recently there has been a line of work developing a new theory of A-type
stochastic integration for computation of the implicit potential arising from a stochastic differen-
tial equation by a stationary analysis [76]. Recently [77] compares the Fokker-Planck equation
derived by A-type stochastic integration with the Fokker-Planck equation arising from the usual
Ito integral in order to obtain an explicit functional form for the difference between the implicit
gradient and the function gradient. While their result is very general, it relies on the assumption
that two Fokker-Planck equations with the same stationary distribution must be the same equation.
Indeed the implication is only one way - given a FP-equation, its stationary distribution is uniquely
determined, but conversely a stationary distribution does not uniquely determine a FP equation.
In our work, we seek a dynamical description of the stochastic gradient descent iterates rather
than a stationary analysis. We start by giving a complete picture of the behavior in one dimension
from a simple derivation from first principles and show that:
1. SGD can be rewritten as Langevin diffusion with respect to a different implicit potential
function.
2. SGD with a large enough constant step size concentrates around the minima of the implicit
potential function, which are different from the minima of the original objective function.
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3. The implicit potential function obtained from this purely Ito integration perspective is not
the same as that obtained from using results from A-type stochastic integration.
In contrast to the claim by [77], in this case the difference between the function minima and
the implicit minim arises purely from the nonconstant diffusion term, since in one dimension the
antisymmetric component is necessarily zero. Note that claim (1) goes beyond just a stationary
analysis of the implicit potential function; we compute the exact form of the implicit gradient
and the scaling in order for a Langevin diffusion process with unit covariance to track stochastic
gradient descent.
The implicit potential function we derive is different from that described by [77]. Using
the temperature β = 2, the implicit gradient we derive is f
′(z)+D′(z)/4√
D(z)
, whereas [77] obtains
f ′(z)+D′(z)/2
D(z) . Empirically we show on a toy example that Langevin diffusion with our implicit
potential actually tracks stochastic gradient descent closely, whereas Langevin diffusion with the
potential function of [77] exhibits very different behavior. The square root term in the denominator
makes this potential function flatter with respect to the stochastic gradient noise.
Following the one dimensional picture, we point out some directions for future work to extend
this analysis to the general multivariate case.
4.1.a Stochastic differential equations
Let p(x) be a distribution over data points x. The stochastic gradient descent update with step
size α can be written as
zt+1 = zt − α E
x∼p
[∇`(x; zt)]+ α( E
x∼p
[∇`(x; zt)]−∇`(xt; zt))
where xt ∼ p is a sample drawn at time t. This is a Euler discretization of the following
continuous-time diffusion process
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dz = A(z) dt+B(z) dw (4.1)
where dw represents integration with respect to Brownian motion, and the quantities A(z) and
B(z) are given by
A(z) = −α E
x∼p





















where D(z) is the empirical covariance matrix of the data points.
Lemma 4.1.1 (Fokker-Planck Equation). For any diffusion equation dz = A(z)dt + B(z)dw, the










































An important result in transforming stochastic differential equations is the stochastic chain rule,
also known as Ito’s Lemma. Here we state the one-dimensional result where A,B are both scalar
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functions.
Lemma 4.1.2 (Ito’s Lemma). Let dz = A(z)dt + B(z)dw be a diffusion equation in one dimen-
sion. Let g(z) be a twice-differentiable scalar function. Then the stochastic differential equation





















































for some constant c, where S(z) is a quantity called the probability current that must be constant
in one dimension. Because the usual parameter domain in machine learning is unbounded, then
this means the probability current must be exactly 0 in order for the distribution to be normalizable.











4.1.b Analysis for one-dimensional SGD
In this section we will characterize the effect of the nonhomogeneous term D(z) on both the
infinitesimal dynamics as well as the limiting stationary distribution.
The diffusion scalar in one dimension is particularly simple - it just modulates the magnitude
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of the random noise term arising from Brownian motion. If D(z) = D were constant, we could




This describes a stochastic differential equation that is essentially slowed down by a factor of
√
D from the original equation. The distribution of sample paths of z˜ is exactly the same as that of
z, only the speed at which the diffusion travels along the path is changed.
To understand the behavior of stochastic gradient descent with nonhomogeneous variance, we
will apply the same normalization idea to transform the stochastic differential equation (4.1) into
one where B(z˜) = 1 is constant.
As done in [78], define the change of variables






Note that dz˜ has the same sign as dz since the scaling term 1/
√
D(z) is always positive. Thus
the path taken by z˜ is a scaled path taken by z.















































This gives an equivalent Langevin equation with an isotropic noise term. We now substitute
the description of stochastic gradient descent into the functions A(z), B(z) to obtain
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We immediately notice that the dynamics are not gradient descent of f , but rather look more
like gradient descent with respect to the function f(z) +αD̂(z)/4 with step size 1/
√
D̂(z). In one












f ′(xi; z)f ′′(xi; z)− 2f ′(z)f ′′(z)
This suggests that stochastic gradient descent is actually implicitly a second-order optimization




−f ′(z) + α
2




f ′(xi; z)f ′′(xi; z)
 (4.6)
We can write the implicit potential function of stochastic gradient descent as a formal path




f ′(v) + αD̂′(v)/4√
D̂(v)
dv
where the choice of z0 does not matter as long as D(z) does not vanish anywhere in the pa-
rameter space. Note that in the d = 1 case, this condition holds as long as there are more than 3
distinct data points and the function f has no singularities (which is usually the case).
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Figure 4.1: Function value Figure 4.2: Function gradient Figure 4.3: Implicit gradient
This suggests that stochastic gradient descent with a fixed step size of α does not actually
concentrate around the true minima of the function, but rather around a minima of a different im-
plicit function. Note that there is no contradiction with classical convergence results of stochastic






4.1.c Empirical observations of the implicit gradient
We consider the function f(x; z) = (zx − 1)2(zx + 1)2 + (zx − 1) with three data points
x ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 1}. This function has a local minima at approximately 0.94 and a global minima at
approximately −1.29 and is plotted in Figure (4.1).
Figure 4.4: Trajectories taken by scaled SGD and
the equivalent normalized Langevin diffusion
Figure 4.5: Trajectory taken by Langevin diffu-
sion obtained from A-type stochastic integration
We show some empirical evidence that the implicit update rule derived in (4.6) tracks the
actual trajectory taken by SGD. We initialize both algorithms at the local maxima at z ≈ 0.3475




according to the scaling derived in (4.4). Figure (4.4) shows that the trajectory of the equivalent
Langevin diffusion update closely tracks the trajectory of stochastic gradient descent. In contrast,
Figure (4.5) shows that the implicit potential function obtained from A-type stochastic integration
eventuallys converge to the same location but has very different initial behavior.
The learning rate α = 0.1 for these examples is chosen to be as large as possible while still
maintaining stability of the learning problem, and this is in line with the usual way learning rates
are chosen.
4.1.d Characterization of the limiting stationary distribution









To better understand the behavior of this potential, we can also analyze the stationary condition









































































The sign of the discriminant
(










characterizes the solution to the stationary condition. A positive discriminant corresponds to a real
root λ which yields the Gibbs distribution. A negative discriminant corresponds to a complex root
λ which introduces sinusoidal terms.
As seen from Figure (4.6), the discriminant is positive throughout most of the parameter space
and is positive at the function’s actual local minima. However, at both of the implicit local minima
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(where the implicit gradient equals zero), the discriminant is actually negative.
Thus the stationary distribution of stochastic gradient descent around the minima of the func-
tion that it implicitly minimizes is not a pure Gibbs distribution. The roots λ1, λ2 are complex
conjugate pairs ν(z) ± iµ(z) for real-valued functions ν, µ, so the stationary distribution can be
written a combination of the two fundamental solutions eν(zt) cos(µ(zt)) and eν(zt) sin(µ(zt)).
Next we compare the stationary distributions achieved by stochastic gradient descent and the
equivalent normalized Langevin diffusion. We run both algorithms over a cover of 2000 samples
initialized uniformly in the interval [−2, 2] at intervals of 0.001. The same step size of α = 0.1
is used, but this time we do not scale the updates of SGD, because we are only interested in
the stationary distribution. The stationary distributions are plotted around the global minimum at
≈ 1.34.
Figure (4.9) shows the stationary distribution of stochastic gradient descent algorithm. Figure
(4.10) shows the stationary distribution of the normalized Langevin diffusion equation derived
from the stochastic gradient descent update. Note that both distributions are skewed towards the
right of the true global minima.
Figure (4.11) shows the stationary distribution of the unnormalized Langevin diffusion equa-
tion, which is just the constant D approximation studied in previous results. Here independent,
identical Gaussian noise is added to each full gradient descent step, so as expected the distribution
looks like a Gaussian around the function’s true global minimum. Note the stark contrast between
the stationary behavior of SGD from this distribution.
Using instead a very small step size (e.g. α = 0.01) causes the stationary distribution of both
stochastic gradient descent and normalized Langevin diffusion to look exactly like Figure (4.11).
The concentration around the implicit potential function’s minima is exclusively a large step size
phenomenon.
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4.2 The correspondence retrieval problem
In (the real-variant of) the phase retrieval problem, an unknown vector x ∈ Rd is to be re-
covered, up to sign, from magnitudes of projections
∣∣〈wi,x〉∣∣ onto n known measurement vectors
w1,w2, . . . ,wn ∈ Rd. The phase retrieval problem has a rich history in several engineering
and scientific domains, especially when the wi are Fourier basis vectors [see, e.g., 79, 80, for
an overview]. The setting where the wi are independent draws from certain probability distri-
butions has been intensely studied in the past several years. Many algorithms based on numer-
ical optimization (e.g., semidefinite programming, local optimization of convex and non-convex
objectives) have been proven to solve the problem with high probability when provided enough
measurements [81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96].
In this paper, we consider a generalization of phase retrieval, which we call correspondence
retrieval: a set of k distinct but unknown points x1,x2, . . . ,xk ∈ Rd are to be recovered from the
unordered collection of projection values 〈wi,x1〉, 〈wi,x2〉, . . . , 〈wi,xk〉 onto n known measure-
ment vectorsw1,w2, . . . ,wn. Importantly, the correspondence of the k projections {〈wi,xj〉}kj=1
across different measurements is unknown. Phase retrieval, as described above, is the special case
where k = 2 and x1 = −x2; the two real numbers corresponding to each measurement are additive
inverses (〈wi,x1〉 and 〈wi,x2〉 = −〈wi,x1〉).
We propose an algorithm for the case of independent standard Gaussian measurement vectors.
For general k, the algorithm correctly recovers the unknown points with high probability from
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n = d + 1 measurements, assuming that the points are linearly independent. For the phase re-
trieval setting, a variant of the algorithm has the same guarantee without the linear independence
assumption. Our algorithms are based on reductions to the Shortest Vector Problem [97] on cer-
tain random lattices; we prove that vectors provided by the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász basis reduction
algorithm [henceforth LLL; 98] yield to the correct solution for the correspondence retrieval prob-
lem. Our reduction generalizes an algorithm of [99] for solving random instances of the Subset
Sum Problem [100, pg. 223]. We note that [101] establish the hardness of the phase retrieval via
reduction from the Subset Sum Problem. Our algorithmic result can be viewed as a reduction in
the other direction.
In the phase retrieval setting, our results show a gap between the number of measurement
vectors required for all vectors x ∈ Rd to be recoverable, and the number of random measurements
sufficient for any particular vector to be recoverable. This is the same distinction between the “for
all” and “for each” guarantees studied in the context of compressive sensing [102]. [103] prove
that n = 2d − 1 measurement vectors are necessary for the “for all” guarantee, and also that the
same number of typical measurement vectors are sufficient. Previous algorithmic results for phase
retrieval require n ≥ Cd for some sufficiently large constant C ≥ 2 or even n ≥ dpoly log(d).
Our algorithmic result has the “for each” guarantee: the n = d+ 1 measurements suffice with high
probability for the particular unknown vector of interest. Note that in the general correspondence
retrieval problem, each measurement is comprised of k unordered real numbers, so the sufficiency
of d+ 1 measurements even when k > 2 is sensible.
We also describe an algorithm that works even when the measurements are corrupted by addi-
tive mean-zero Gaussian noise.1 The algorithm is essentially the same as one proposed by [104]
for the related parameter estimation problem in the mixtures of linear regressions model; the main
technique used is the method-of-moments and orthogonal tensor decomposition [105]. We ob-
serve that the moments used in the algorithm are invariant to the noise variance, and hence the
algorithm is noise-robust in this sense. However, the number of measurements required by this
1In phase retrieval, noise is typically added to the square (magnitude)
∣∣〈wi,x〉∣∣2 of the projections [86, 82]. In our
setting, independent noise is added to the k projections {〈wi,xj〉}kj=1 themselves.
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algorithm, even when the noise is absent, is larger than that of the lattice-based algorithm. The
moment-based algorithm appears to ignore consistency constraints across measurements that the
lattice-based algorithm is able to exploit.
4.2.a Setting and notations
This section describes the correspondence retrieval problem, notations and results concerning
lattices and tensors, and the non-degeneracy condition required by the proposed algorithms.
Correspondence retrieval problem
In an instance of the correspondence retrieval problem, k distinct but unknown points in Rd,
denoted by x1,x2, . . . ,xk ∈ Rd, are revealed through collections of noisy linear measurements.
The n measurement vectors, denoted by w1,w2, . . . ,wn, are i.i.d. random vectors in Rd with
the standard multivariate Gaussian distribution N(0, Id×d). For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the i-th
measurement is the unordered (multi-)set of k (Euclidean) inner products between wi and the k
points, corrupted by additive zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ2:
Mσi := {〈wi,x1〉+ σεi,1, 〈wi,x2〉+ σεi,2, . . . , 〈wi,xk〉+ σεi,k} ,
where the {εi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤k are i.i.d. N(0, 1) random variables. The noiseless version of the prob-
lem has σ2 = 0, and the measurements are denoted byMi :=M0i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The goal is to (approximately) reconstruct the set of k unknown points {x1,x2, . . . ,xk} (i.e.,
reconstruct up to reordering), from the data (w1,Mσ1 ), (w2,Mσ2 ), . . . , (wn,Mσn).
Notations
The firstm positive integers are denoted by [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m}. The Euclidean inner product
between vectors u and v is denoted by 〈u,v〉, and the Euclidean norm is‖v‖2 :=
√〈v,v〉. The
i-th largest singular value of a matrix M is denoted by σi(M ); the spectral norm (i.e., largest
singular value) is also denoted by‖M‖2.
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Lattices






zibi : z1, z2, . . . , zr ∈ Z
 ⊂ Rm ,
where Z denotes the set of integers. The Shortest Vector Problem is to find the shortest non-zero




The length of the shortest vector is denoted by λ(B).
Current techniques for this problem involve “reducing” the input basis B so that it is at least
somewhat well-conditioned in a certain sense. [98] show that the first vector b1 in a suitably
reduced basisB has length at most 2(n−1)/2 · λ(B). They also give an algorithm (LLL) that, given
a basis B ∈ Zm×n with integer coefficients, computes a reduced basis B′ with Λ(B′) = Λ(B) in
time polynomial in m, n, and log(‖B‖∞), where‖B‖∞ denotes the magnitude of the largest entry
inB. In this sense, LLL is a 2(n−1)/2-approximation algorithm for the Shortest Vector Problem.
An important concern with the use of LLL on bases with real-valued coefficients is numerical
precision. There are two cases where precision needs to be considered: precision in the mea-
surements, and precision in the internal arithmetic operations in LLL. We discuss these issues in
Appendix 4.2.f. To simplify the foregoing discussion, we assume that LLL may be run on input
bases with real-valued coefficients.
Tensors
For a positive integer p, a real order-p tensor T ∈ ⊗pi=1Rn is a p-linear function T : Rn ×
R
n × · · · × Rn → R. We only require tensors of order two (i.e., matrices) and order three. The
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rank-one tensor v1 ⊗ v2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vp, for vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vp ∈ Rn, is the p-linear function
satisfying
(v1 ⊗ v2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vp)(u1,u2, . . . ,up) = 〈v1,u1〉〈v2,u2〉 · · · 〈vp,up〉 , u1,u2, . . . ,up ∈ Rn .
We use the shorthand notation v⊗p for v ∈ Rn to denote the (symmetric) rank-one tensor v ⊗
v ⊗ · · · ⊗ v ∈ ⊗pj=1Rn. For p = 2, this is the symmetric outer product of a vector: v⊗2 =
vv>. We may also identify a tensor T ∈ ⊗pi=1Rn with a multi-index array of np real numbers;
the (i1, i2, . . . , ip)-th entry is T (ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eip), where e1, e2, . . . , en are the standard coordinate
basis vectors for Rn.
Non-degeneracy conditions
Arrange the k unknown points in the matrix X := [x1|x2| · · · |xk] ∈ Rd×k. Our main algo-
rithms requireX to have rank(X) = k—i.e., the points must be linearly independent.
We measure how ill-conditioned X is in two ways. The first is based on the singular values
σ1(X) ≥ σ2(X) ≥ · · · ≥ σk(X) of X , primarily through the ratio κ(X) := σ1(X)/σk(X).
The second is λ(X), the length of the shortest non-zero vector in the lattice Λ(X). The quantities
κ(X) and λ(X) are related in the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix 4.2.h.
Proposition 4.2.1. λ(X) ≥ mini∈[k]‖xi‖2 · 2κ(X)/(κ(X)2 + 1).
For k = 2 (the phase retrieval setting), a variant of our lattice-based algorithm requires x1 6=
x2, but permits the points to be linearly dependent.
4.2.b Noiseless correspondence retrieval




Our main algorithm, specified in Algorithm 1, is based on reductions to the Shortest Vector
Problem in lattices. Using information from d + 1 measurements and the input parameter β > 0,
the algorithm constructs k lattice bases with the following properties. First, for each t ∈ [k], the
only short vectors in the t-th lattice reveal which elements in the first d measurements correspond
to the unknown vector xt. Second, when β is sufficiently large, all other vectors in the lattices
are longer by exponentially-large factors. This lattice construction is based on the algorithm of
[99] for solving random instances of the Subset Sum Problem via reduction to the Shortest Vector
Problem. Our algorithm similarly approximately solves these Shortest Vector Problem instances
using LLL to obtain the correspondence information, and then recovers all of the k unknown points
by solving systems of linear equations from the first d measurements.
Main result and analysis
The main performance guarantee for Algorithm 1 is given in Theorem 20 below.




2 · 2dk/2 · √d+ 1 + 1
)dk+1









pi · δ2 · λ(X) ,
then with probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 1 returns {x1,x2, . . . ,xk}.
Numerical issues and running time are discussed in Appendix 4.2.f. The rest of this subsub-
section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 20.
Let R := 2dk/2 · √d+ 1, and let ZR := {(z0, z) ∈ Z × Zdk : 0 < z20 +‖z‖22 ≤ R2}. For

























Algorithm 1 Lattice-based algorithm for noiseless correspondence retrieval
input Data (wi,Mi) for i ∈ [d+ 1], parameter β > 0.
output Set of points {x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂k}, or “failure”.
1: ifW := [w1|w2| · · · |wd]> is singular then
2: return “failure”.
3: end if
4: Let yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,k be an arbitrary ordering the elements ofMi, for each i ∈ [d+ 1].
5: Define a = (ai,j : i ∈ [d], j ∈ [k]) ∈ Rdk by
ai,j := 〈wd+1, w˜i〉yi,j ,
where w˜i is the i-th column ofW−1.






















i,j ∈ Λ(B(t)) for (ẑ0, ẑ) ∈ Z × Zdk be the vector
returned by LLL as an approximate solution to Shortest Vector Problem for Λ(B(t)).
9: if the (dk + 2)-th coordinate of L(t)(ẑ0, ẑ) is non-zero then
10: return “failure”.
11: end if
12: Let x̂t be a solution to the system of linear equations (in x ∈ Rd)
〈wi,x〉 = yi,j , (i, j) ∈ [d]× [k]  ẑi,j 6= 0 ,
or 0 if no solution exists.
13: end for
14: return x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂k.
The coefficient vectors in ZR include all those that could potentially determine lattice vectors in
Λ(B(t)) for t ∈ [k] with length at most R. Below, we prove that these lattice vectors either provide
the correspondence information needed to recover the unknown points (and have length R), or
they have length more than βrδ with high probability. A crude bound on the cardinality of ZR is
|ZR| ≤
∣∣{−bRc,−bRc+ 1, . . . , bRc − 1, bRc}∣∣dk+1 ≤ (2 · 2(dk+1)/2 · √d+ 1 + 1)dk+1 .
For each i ∈ [d], let pii : [k]→ [k] denote the (unknown) permutation on [k] that determines the
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arbitrary ordering ofMi from Algorithm 1:
yi,j = 〈wi,xpii(j)〉 , i ∈ [d], j ∈ [k] .
Also, for δ ∈ (0, 1), let Eδ be the event that
1. the smallest singular value ofW is bounded from below: σd(W ) ≥ δ/(4
√
d);





3. for each i ∈ [d], j ∈ [k], and (z0, z) ∈ ZR such that |zi,j − z0|+
∑
j′ 6=j |zi,j′| > 0,
〈













This event characterizes the properties needed from the first d measurements; Lemma 4.2.2 shows
that it has large probability mass. The proof, given in Appendix 4.2.h, is based on known properties
of Gaussian random matrices.
Lemma 4.2.2. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), Pr (Eδ) ≥ 1− δ.
We now show in Lemma 4.2.3 that, for each t ∈ [k], there is a relatively short vector in Λ(B(t))
that provides the correspondence information needed to recover xt. We also show in Lemma 4.2.4
that when β is sufficiently large, other vectors in Λ(B(t)) are considerably longer, and hence cannot
be returned by LLL.
To simplify notation, assume that pid+1(j) = j for each j ∈ [k], so we have yd+1,t = 〈wd+1,xt〉






1 if pii(j) = t ,
0 otherwise .
Recall that for each t ∈ [k], the lattice vector in Λ(B(t)) determined by coefficient vector (z0, z) ∈
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Z× Zdk is denoted by








Observe that the coefficient vector (z0, z) is revealed in the first dk + 1 coordinates of the lattice
vector L(t)(z0, z); the final coordinate of the lattice vector is used to make some vectors very long.
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Proof. Assume Eδ holds, which guarantees the existence of W−1 and thus permits the w˜i to be


























xt = 〈wd+1,xt〉 .
The claim now follows by direct computation, using the above identity and the definition of z(t).
Lemma 4.2.4. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), conditional on the event Eδ, with probability at least 1− δ (over
the choice of wd+1), for each t ∈ [k], every coefficient vector (z0, z) ∈ Z × Zdk that is not an
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integer multiple of (1, z(t)) satisfies
∥∥L(t)(z0, z)∥∥2 > min{R, √z20 +‖z‖22 + β2r2δ} .
Proof. Assume Eδ holds. This implies, in particular, that W−1 and the w˜i are well-defined. Fix
t ∈ [k], and let Z(1, z(t)) denote the set of integer multiples of (1, z(t)). For any coefficient vector
















Observe that ‖L(t)(z0, z)‖2 > R for all (z0, z) ∈ (Z × Zdk) \ ZR. Below, we prove that with
probability at least 1− δ/k, ‖L(t)(z0, z)‖22 > z20 +‖z‖22 + β2r2δ for every (z0, z) ∈ ZR \Z(1, z(t)).
Combining this with a union bound over all choices of t ∈ [k] proves the lemma.
Fix any such (z0, z) ∈ ZR, and consider the parenthesized term in Eq. (4.9) (without the
squaring). By Lemma 4.2.3, the term expands to
∑
i,j





















zi,j − z(t)i,j z0
)
w˜i .
Because wd+1 ∼ N(0, Id), the final expression is a N(0,‖v‖22) random variable, and hence by































Using this bound with Eq. (4.10) and a union bound, it follows that with probability at least 1−δ/k,
we have ‖L(t)(z0, z)‖22 > z20 +‖z‖22 + β2r2δ for all (z0, z) ∈ ZR \ Z(1, z(t)).
We now prove the bound in Eq. (4.11) on the event Eδ. Because the w˜i are the columns of



















for each i ∈ [d]. Therefore,‖v‖22 may be bounded below as










Since (z0, z) /∈ Z(1, z(t)), at least one of the following is true:
1. there exists i ∈ [d] such that zi,pi−1i (t) 6= z0;
2. there exists i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [k] \ {pi−1i (t)} such that zi,pii(j) 6= 0.
In either case, there exists i ∈ [d] such that |zi,pi−1i (t)− z0|+
∑
j∈[k]:pii(j) 6=t |zi,pii(j)| > 0, so using the
third condition in the event Eδ,
d∑
i=1













2 ln(2/δ) from the second condition in
the event Eδ proves the required lower-bound on‖v‖22 from Eq. (4.11).
We now prove Theorem 20. With probability at least 1−δ/2 (over the choice ofw1,w2, . . . ,wd),
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1. Event Eδ/2 holds (Lemma 4.2.2).
Moreover, conditional on Eδ/2,
2. ‖L(t)(1, z(t))‖2 =
√
d+ 1 for each t ∈ [k] (Lemma 4.2.3);
and, with probability at least 1− δ/2 (over the choice of wd+1),
3. for each t ∈ [k], every non-zero vector in L(t)(z0, z) ∈ Λ(B(t)) for (z0, z) ∈ Z × Zdk
with length at most R = 2(dk+1)/2
√
d+ 1 is either an integer multiple of L(t)(1, z(t)), or has
length ‖L(t)(z0, z)‖2 >
√
z20 +‖z‖22 + β2r2δ/2; the length in this latter case is more than R
when β ≥ R/rδ/2 (Lemma 4.2.4).
Statements 1–3 above hold together with probability at least 1 − δ, so we assume that they hold.
In particular, Algorithm 1 does not return “failure” upon checking if W singular. As long as β ≥
R/rδ/2, for each t ∈ [k], the approximate solution returned by LLL for Λ(B(t)) is L(t)(ẑ0, ẑ) =
L(t)(c, cz(t)) for some c 6= 0. The (dk + 2)-th coordinate of this vector is zero—so Algorithm 1
does not return “failure” on account of this check—and x̂t is obtained as a solution to the system
of linear equations
〈wi,x〉 = yi,j , (i, j) ∈ [d]× [k]  cz(t)i,j 6= 0 .
By the definition of z(t) and non-singularity ofW , we have x̂t = xt for all t ∈ [k]. This completes
the proof of Theorem 20.
Phase retrieval
The special case of correspondence retrieval where k = 2 and x1 = −x2 6= 0 is known as the
(real-valued) phase retrieval problem, as described in the introduction. Indeed, it is easy to see that
the general k = 2 correspondence retrieval problem may be reduced to this case by “centering”
the measurements. However, the unknown points x1 and x2 are no longer linearly independent, so
Algorithm 1 is not directly applicable.
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A simple fix is to pick a random vector z ∼ N(0, Id), and replace each unordered measurement
Mi = {〈wi,x1〉, 〈wi,x2〉} with M′i := {〈wi, z〉 + 〈wi,x1〉, 〈wi, z〉 + 〈wi,x2〉}. The points
to recover become z + x and z − x, where x := x1 = −x2. Let X˜ := [z + x|z − x] ∈
R
d×2. The following proposition gives a bound on κ(X˜) = σ1(X˜)/σ2(X˜); its proof is given in
Appendix 4.2.h.
Proposition 4.2.5. For any vectors a, b ∈ Rd, the matrixM := [a+ b|a− b] ∈ Rd×2 satisfies
σ1(M)
σ2(M)
≤ r + 1/r∣∣sin(θ)∣∣ ,
where r :=‖a‖2 /‖b‖2, and θ is the angle between a and b.
It is easy to see that









with high probability, and hence Algorithm 1 may be applied.
We can also give a direct algorithm for solving the phase retrieval problem via LLL, with
qualitatively the same guarantees as Algorithm 1, where ‖x‖2 replaces the role of λ(X). The
details are given in Appendix 4.2.g.
Number of measurements. Our algorithms require n = d+ 1 measurements for exact recovery,
which is the best possible (in dimension d ≥ 2), even in this phase retrieval setting. With only
d linearly independent measurement vectors, no algorithm can distinguish among 2d−1 distinct
solutions (of the form {W−1 diag(s)Wx,−W−1 diag(s)Wx} for s ∈ {±1}d) that give rise to
the same d measurements.
As discussed in the introduction, [103] prove that n = 2d − 1 measurement vectors (whether
random or deterministic) are necessary to ensure that every non-zero x ∈ Rd can be recovered,
up to sign, from measurements with these measurement vectors. Because our algorithms only use
d+ 1 (Gaussian) measurement vectors, they must be insufficient for recovering some x up to sign
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(in dimension d ≥ 3), even though for any fixed x, they suffice with high probability.
4.2.c Noisy correspondence retrieval
This section sketches a moment-based algorithm for the noisy correspondence retrieval prob-
lem.
Main idea





x⊗2j ∈ Rd×d and T :=
k∑
j=1
x⊗3j ∈ Rd×d×d .
Under the condition rank(X) = k, there is an efficient algorithm based on tensor decompositions
that, if given M and T up to some sufficiently small error as inputs, returns accurate estimates of
the points x1,x2, . . . ,xk up to reordering [see, e.g., 105].
The crucial idea is that the moment matrix M and tensor T can be estimated from the data
(w1,Mσ1 ), (w2,Mσ2 ), . . . , (wn,Mσn), even though the measurements are unordered. This was
observed by [104] in the case of a related (and indeed, more difficult) model of mixtures of linear
regressions. In their model, there is no noise (i.e., σ = 0), but instead of observing all of Mi,
only a random element ofMi is observed (and this random choice is independent of the random
measurement vectors, and identically distributed across all n measurements). Yi, Caramanis, and
Sanghavi give an algorithm for learning the k unknown points when n is sufficiently large (nearly
linear in d, polynomial in k and κ(X)).2 Therefore, it is clear that the noiseless correspondence
retrieval problem may be reduced to their noiseless mixtures of linear regressions problem.
Our main observation is that the same estimators designed for the noiseless setting may also be
applied in the noisy setting.
2[104] also give a hybrid algorithm that combines alternating minimization with the moment-based algorithm. This
hybrid algorithm can exactly recover the k unknown points in the noiseless setting.
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Moment estimators



















(〈wi,xj〉+ σεi,j)3 (w⊗3i − T (wi))
 ,
respectively. Here, for any vector v ∈ Rd, the third-order tensor T (v) is defined by T (v) :=∑d
j=1 (v ⊗ ej ⊗ ej + ej ⊗ v ⊗ ej + ej ⊗ ej ⊗ v), where e1, e2, . . . , ed is any fixed orthonormal
basis for Rd. The i-th term in each of M̂ and T̂ is symmetric with respect to the k values inMσi ,
and hence can be formed using just the unordered measurements.
The unbiasedness of M̂ and T̂ in the noiseless case (σ = 0) follows immediately from the
following proposition. We give a simple proof in Appendix 4.2.h for completeness.





〈w,u〉2 (w⊗2 − Id)] = u⊗2 , E [1
6
〈w,u〉3 (w⊗3 − T (w))] = u⊗3 .
In the noisy case, we have the following analogous proposition, which implies the unbiasedness
of M̂ and T̂ for any noise level σ ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.2.7. Let w ∼ N(0, Id) and ε ∼ N(0, 1) be independent. For any vector u ∈ Rd





(〈w,u〉+ σε)2 (w⊗2 − Id)] = u⊗2 , E [1
6
(〈w,u〉+ σε)3 (w⊗3 − T (w))] = u⊗3 .
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.2.6 by replacingw andu, respectively, with w˜ := (w, ε) ∼
N(0, Id+1) and u˜ := (u, σ) ∈ Rd+1; and considering the appropriate sub-matrix and sub-tensor.
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Proposition 4.2.7 justifies the use of essentially the same moment-based algorithm of Yi, Cara-
manis, and Sanghavi for the noisy correspondence retrieval problem:
1. Compute the estimates M̂ and T̂ from (w1,Mσ1 ), (w2,Mσ2 ), . . . , (wn,Mσn).
2. Apply the tensor decomposition algorithm of [105], and return the vectors from the approx-
imate decomposition x̂1, x̂2, . . . , x̂k.
The analysis of Yi, Caramanis, and Sanghavi can be used to give a bound on the number of mea-
surements needed to accurately estimate the k unknown points: assuming maxj∈k] ‖xj‖2 = 1, for




















‖x̂pi(j) − xj‖2 ≤ ε ,
with probability at least 1 − δ, where the min is over permutations pi : [k] → [k]. Here, the O˜(·)
hides factors that are poly-logarithmic in those that appear, and Xσ is the (d + 1)×k matrix that
appends a row toX with all entries equal to σ. We omit a detailed bound and analysis because they
are based entirely on the results of Yi, Caramanis, and Sanghavi, and the result is not comparable
to the results we obtain in the noiseless setting with the lattice-based algorithms.
4.2.d Discussion
The moment-based algorithm for the correspondence retrieval problem does not appear to ef-
ficiently use the information contained in individual measurements. By averaging over the mea-
surements in the computation of M̂ and T̂ , critical constraint information is lost. In contrast, the
lattice-based algorithm does not average over the projection values nor the measurements them-
selves. It would be interesting to understand if there is indeed a gap between these distinct types
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of algorithms.
It would also be interesting to consider other classes of measurement vectors. Assuming a
Gaussian distribution is convenient for analysis of our lattice-based algorithm, although it is plau-
sible that other distributions satisfying some kind of anti-concentration condition at every point
would also suffice. Handling certain discrete distributions would also simplify the numerical pre-
cision issues. The moment-based algorithm, however, critically relies on higher-order moment
calculations specific to the Gaussian distribution. It is not clear to what extent that algorithm
would work with other classes of measurement vectors. A plausible alternative is to use semidef-
inite programming to recover M and T (or other related moment tensors). Indeed, the results
of [106] imply that M can be recovered from O(dk) measurements, where the distribution of the
measurement vectors may be Gaussian or from a certain class of finitely-supported distributions.
Our lattice-based algorithm cannot handle measurement noise, with the cryptographic hardness
of the Shortest Vector Problem being the main barrier. There is also cryptographic evidence that
even deterministic measurement errors make related problems computationally intractable [107].
In practice, LLL has been observed to find the shortest vector in lattices in low dimensions, and
in high dimensions, its empirical performance is somewhat better than the worst-case approxi-
mation factor [108]. Nevertheless, it is desirable to find different algorithms for phase retrieval
and correspondence retrieval that do not use LLL but still work with the same optimal number of
measurements.
4.2.e Gaussian inequalities
Theorem 16 ([109, 110]). Let Z be an n × n matrix whose entries are i.i.d. N(0, 1) random


















The following proposition is based on elementary properties of the Gaussian distribution.
Proposition 4.2.8. Let Z ∼ N(0, 1). For any η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(Z2 ≤ piη2/2) ≤ η, and Pr(|Z| >√
2 ln(2/η)) ≤ η.
































dz = η .
The second bound is a standard upper-bound on the Gaussian tail.
4.2.f Numerical issues
In this section, we discuss the numerical issues with Algorithm 1. We assume that the coeffi-
cients of the measurement vectors w1,w2, . . . ,wd and the k unknown points x1,x2, . . . ,xk are
represented with sufficiently fine precision—say, with B bits of precision—and that the projection
values 〈wi,xj〉 in the measurements are exact. Here, B should be large enough so that the Gaus-
sian anti-concentration properties in the proof of Theorem 20 still hold (say, within a constant mul-
tiplicative factor). The anti-concentration property from Proposition 4.2.8 is used with η no smaller
than λ(X) ·2−poly(d,k,log(1/δ)), so the number of bits needed is poly(d, k, log(1/δ)) plus the number
of bits needed to represent λ(X), the length of the shortest vector in Λ(X). Recall that λ(X) is
no larger than minj∈[k] ‖xj‖2 and, by Proposition 4.2.1, no smaller than minj∈[k] ‖xj‖2 /κ(X).
The numerical work performed by Algorithm 1 is dominated by the calls to LLL and the solving
of linear systems. Lemma 4.2.9 bounds how much smaller or larger the coefficients of the lattice
basis (used in the calls to LLL) are relative to the projection values. Lemma 4.2.9 also bounds the
condition number of the matrix involved in the linear system that is used to solve for the unknown
points.
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Lemma 4.2.9. With probability at least 1− δ,










β · |ai,j| ∈










) , β · 4√2d ln(8d/δ) · |yi,j|
δ
 , i ∈ [d], j ∈ [k] .
Proof. From Theorem 16, it follows that
Pr
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Condition on this 1 − δ/2 probability event. Recall that w˜i is the i-th column of W−1. The







So, by Proposition 4.2.8 and union bound,
Pr
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Since ai,j = 〈wd+1, w˜i〉yi,j , combining these probability bounds proves the claim.
When calling LLL, we may treat the lattice basis coefficients as integers by rescaling. By
Lemma 4.2.9, the number of bits required to represent these coefficients may grow from B to
B +O








With the required value of β from the statement of Theorem 20, the running time of LLL—and
also of Algorithm 1—is therefore poly(d, k, log(B), log(κ(X)), log(1/δ)).
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Algorithm 2 Lattice-based algorithm for phase retrieval
input Data (wi, yi) for i ∈ [d+ 1], parameter β > 0.
output Hidden point x̂ (up to a sign), or “failure”.
1: ifW := [w1|w2| · · · |wd]> is singular then
2: return “failure”.
3: end if
4: Define a = (ai : i ∈ [d]) ∈ Rd by
ai := 〈wd+1, w˜i〉yi ,












6: Let (ẑ0, ẑ) ∈ Z× Zd specify an approximate solution ẑ0b0 +
∑
i ẑibi ∈ Λ(B) to the Shortest
Vector Problem for Λ(B) using LLL.
7: if |ẑ0| = |ẑ1| = |ẑ2| = · · · = |ẑd| is not true then
8: return “failure”
9: end if
10: Let x̂ be a solution to the system of linear equations (in t ∈ Rd)
〈wi, t〉 = sign(ẑi)yi , i ∈ [d] .
11: return x̂.
4.2.g Direct algorithm for phase retrieval
In the phase retrieval problem, there is a single hidden vector x, and for each i ∈ [d + 1], we
draw wi ∼ N(0, Id) and observe yi :=
∣∣〈wi,x〉∣∣. Our goal is to recover x by finding the vector
of unknown signs s := (s1, s2, . . . , sd) ∈ {±1}d, where si := sign(〈wi,x〉) for each i ∈ [d]. A
modified version of our main algorithm, specified in Algorithm 2, constructs a lattice where the
shortest vector’s coefficients are exactly the same as s or −s.
The performance guarantee of this algorithm is given below in an analogous result to Theo-
rem 20.
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2 · 2d/2√d+ 1 + 1
)d+1
δ2‖x‖2 pi
then with probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 2 returns x̂ = x.
Let Eδ be the event that
1. the smallest singular value ofW is bounded from below: σd(W ) ≥ δ/(4
√
d);





3. for each i ∈ [d] and (z0, z) ∈ ZR such that |zi − z0| > 0,
〈
wi, (zi − z0)x






Also, let R := 2d/2
√
d+ 1 and ZR := {(z0, z) ∈ Z× Zd : 0 < z20 +‖z‖22 ≤ R2}.
Lemma 4.2.10. For any δ ∈ (0, 1),Pr (Eδ) ≥ 1− δ.
The proof of this lemma is completely analogous to that of Lemma 4.2.2, so we omit it.
Let s0 := sign(〈wd+1,x〉). The following lemma shows there exists a short lattice vector
which solves the recovery problem. Its proof is analogous to that of Lemma 4.2.3, so again we
omit it.

















Finally, we state a lemma that lower-bounds the length of lattice vectors that are not integer
multiples of L(s0, s).
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Lemma 4.2.12. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), conditioned on the event Eδ, for every coefficient vector (z0, z)
that is not an integer multiple of (s0, s), we have
‖L(z0, z)‖22 > min
{
































∣∣〈wi,x〉∣∣ (zi − z0s0si) .
Because z is not an integer multiple of s and z0s0 is an integer, there exists an index i∗ ∈ [d] such
that zi − z0s0si∗ 6= 0. Then the sum can be rewritten as
〈wd+1, w˜i∗〉
∣∣〈wi∗ , (zi∗ − z0s0si∗)x〉∣∣+∑
i 6=i∗
〈wd+1, w˜i〉
∣∣〈wi, (zi − z0s0si)x〉∣∣ . (4.13)
We now show that the first term puts small probability mass over any short interval independent of
the value of the summation over i 6= i∗. This gives a lower bound on the absolute value of the last
coordinate by considering an interval around the negative of the second term.
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Since (z0, z) ∈ ZR implies (z0s0si∗ , z) ∈ ZR for either of the two values of s0 and si∗ , the
third condition in Eδ gives






Since W−1 is full rank, there is a component of w˜i∗ which is orthogonal to the span of
{w˜i}i 6=i∗ . We write this as




where 〈u,wi〉 = 0 for all i 6= i∗. Now let ai for i 6= i∗ be the coefficients above, and let ai∗ := 1.
























on the event Eδ and the second inequality from ai∗ = 1.
Thus Eq. (4.13) can be rewritten as the sum of two independent terms
〈wd+1,u〉
∣∣〈wi∗ , (zi∗ − z0s0si∗)x〉∣∣+∑
i 6=i∗
(
〈wd+1,−aiw˜i〉|〈wi∗ , (zi∗ − z0s0si∗)x〉+ 〈wd+1, w˜i〉
∣∣〈wi, (zi − z0s0si)x〉∣∣) (4.14)
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The first term, 〈wd+1,u〉
∣∣〈wi∗ , (zi∗ − z0s0si∗)x〉∣∣, has distribution N(0, σ2), where














The event that Eq. (4.13) is small is when the Gaussian distribution returns a value in the interval
of length 2rδ centered around the second term. The probability of this event is no more than
1√
2piσ2












by the choice of rδ. Therefore, with probability at least 1 − δ, the quantity in 4.13 is at least rδ,
so the contribution of the last coordinate to the norm of the lattice vector is at least β2r2δ , so the
norm of this lattice vector is at least
√
z20 + ‖z‖22 + β2r2δ . To complete the proof we note that for
all (z0, z) 6∈ ZR, by definition the norm of ‖z‖2 is at least R.
We now prove Theorem 17. By the choices of R and β and Lemma 4.2.12, every incorrect
coefficient vector has norm at least 2d/2
√
d+ 1, so it will not be returned by the LLL algorithm.
By Lemma 4.2.11 there exists a short vector with coefficients (s0, s), so LLL recovers the correct
signs.
4.2.h Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1
Claim 4.2.13. λ(X) ≥ mini∈[k] ‖xi −Π(−i)xi‖2 where Π(−i) is the orthogonal projection to the
span of {xj}j 6=i.
Proof. Let v be a non-zero vector in the lattice with basis X . Write v =
∑k
j=1 zjxj , where
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z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ Z. Pick any i ∈ [k] such that zi 6= 0, and let r := −
∑
j 6=i zjxj , so
‖v‖22 = ‖zixi − r‖22 ≥
∥∥zixi −Π(−i)zixi∥∥22 = |zi|∥∥xi −Π(−i)xi∥∥22 ≥ ∥∥xi −Π(−i)xi∥∥22 .
Above, the first inequality follows from the Pythagorean theorem, and the second inequality fol-
lows because zi ∈ Z \ {0}.
By Claim 4.2.13, it suffices to lower-bound the distance between xi and the subspace spanned
by {xj}j 6=i, for every i ∈ [k]. So fix i ∈ [k], and any non-zero vector ri in the span of {xj}j 6=i.
Let the singular value decomposition of X be given by X = USV >, where U ∈ Rd×k has
orthonormal columns, S = diag(σ1(X), σ2(X), . . . , σk(X))  0 is diagonal, and V ∈ Rk×k
is orthogonal. Let αj ∈ Rk denote the j-th column of V >. Then xi = USαi, and there exists














































Since this holds for any ri in the span of {xj}j 6=i, the distance between xi and the span of {xj}j 6=i
is also at least
‖xi‖2
√





The claim in Proposition 4.2.1 follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.2
It suffices to show the following probability bounds: (i) Pr(σd(W ) ≤ δ/(4
√
d)) ≤ δ/4; (ii)




2 ln(4/δ)) ≤ δ/4; (iii) Pr(Eq. (4.12) does not hold) ≤ δ/(2dk|ZR|) for
each i ∈ [d], j ∈ [k], and (z0, z) ∈ ZR such that |zi,j − z0| +
∑
j′ 6=j |zi,j′| > 0. Combining these
bounds with a union bound proves the claim.
The first two bounds follow from Theorem 16. The third requires Proposition 4.2.8 and the
observation that the inner product in Eq. (4.12) is distributed as N(0,‖v‖22), where v := (zi,j −
z0)xpii(j) +
∑
j′ 6=j zi,j′xpii(j′). The condition on (z0, z) implies that v is a non-zero vector in the
lattice Λ(X), which has‖v‖2 ≥ λ(X) by definition.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.5
Let M˜ := [a|b] ∈ Rd×2. The non-zero singular values of the matrix M = [a + b|a − b] are
the same as the square-roots of the non-zero eigenvalues of
MM> = 2aa> + 2bb> = 2M˜M˜
>
.







The eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 of this matrix can be computed explicitly:






‖a‖22‖b‖22 − 〈a, b〉2
)
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≤ r + 1/r∣∣sin(θ)∣∣ .
Proof of Proposition 4.2.6
By homogeneity, we may assume‖u‖2 = 1. Let g := 〈w,u〉 ∼ N(0, 1), and let y := w− gu.
Observe that g and y are independent, and
Ey = 0 , Ey⊗2 = Id − u⊗2 =
d∑
j=1
e⊗2j − u⊗2 , Ey⊗3 = 0 .
Using these facts, we have
E〈w,u〉2 (w⊗2 − Id) = E g2 (g2u⊗2 + y⊗2 − Id) = E g4u⊗2 − E g2u⊗2 = 2u⊗2 ,
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E〈w,u〉3w⊗3 = E g3 (gu+ y)⊗3
= E g3
(
g3u⊗3 + g (u⊗ y ⊗ y + y ⊗ u⊗ y + y ⊗ y ⊗ u))




u⊗ ej ⊗ ej + ej ⊗ u⊗ ej + ej ⊗ ej ⊗ u− 3u⊗3
)
= 6u⊗3 + 3T (u) ,
E〈w,u〉3w = E g3 (gu+ y) = 3u ,
so E〈w,u〉3 (w⊗3 − T (w)) = 6u⊗3. This proves the claims in Proposition 4.2.6.
4.3 Linear regression with an unknown permutation
Consider the problem of recovering an unknown vector w¯ ∈ Rd from noisy linear mea-
surements when the correspondence between the measurement vectors and the measurements
themselves is unknown. The measurement vectors (i.e., covariates) from Rd are denoted by
x1,x2, . . . ,xn; for each i ∈ [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}, the i-th measurement (i.e., response) yi is
obtained using xp¯i(i):
yi = w¯
>xp¯i(i) + εi , i ∈ [n] . (4.15)
Above, p¯i is an unknown permutation on [n], and the ε1, ε2, . . . , εn are unknown measurement
errors.
This problem (which has been called unlabeled sensing [112], linear regression with an un-
known permutation [113], and linear regression with shuffled labels [114]) arises in many settings.
For example, physical sensing limitations may create ambiguity in or lose the ordering of mea-
surements. Or, the covariates and responses may be derived from separate databases that lack
appropriate record linkage (perhaps for privacy reasons). See the aforementioned references for
more details on these applications. The problem is also interesting because the missing correspon-
dence makes an otherwise well-understood problem into one with very different computational
and statistical properties.
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Prior works. [112] study conditions on the measurement vectors that permit recovery of any
target vector w¯ under noiseless measurements. They show that when the entries of the xi are
drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution, and n ≥ 2d, then almost surely, every vector w¯ ∈ Rd
is uniquely determined by noiseless correspondence-free measurements as in (4.15). (Under noisy
measurements, it is shown that w¯ can be recovered when an appropriate signal-to-noise ratio tends
to infinity.) It is also shown that n ≥ 2d is necessary for such a guarantee that holds for all vectors
w¯ ∈ Rd.
[113] study statistical and computational limits on recovering the unknown permutation p¯i. On
the statistical front, they consider necessary and sufficient conditions on the signal-to-noise ratio
SNR := ‖w¯‖22 /σ2 when the measurement errors (εi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from the normal distribu-
tion N(0, σ2) and the measurement vectors (xi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from the standard multivariate
normal distribution N(0, Id). Roughly speaking, exact recovery of p¯i is possible via maximum like-
lihood when SNR ≥ nc for some absolute constant c > 0, and approximate recovery is impossible
for any method when SNR ≤ nc′ for some other absolute constant c′ > 0. On the computa-









given arbitrary x1,x2, . . . ,xn ∈ Rd and y1, y2, . . . , yn ∈ R is NP-hard when d = Ω(n)3, but
admits a polynomial-time algorithm (in fact, an O(n log n)-time algorithm based on sorting) when
d = 1.
[114] observe that the maximum likelihood estimator can be inconsistent for estimating w¯ in
certain settings (including the normal setting of [113], with SNR fixed but n → ∞). One of the
alternative estimators they suggest is consistent under additional assumptions in dimension d = 1.
[116] give a O(dnd+1)-time algorithm that, in dimension d = 2, is guaranteed to approximately
3[113] prove that PARTITION reduces to the problem of deciding if the optimal value of (4.16) is zero or non-zero.
Note that PARTITION is weakly, but not strongly, NP-hard: it admits a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm [115, Section
4.2]. In Section 4.3.d, we prove that the least squares problem is strongly NP-hard by reduction from 3-PARTITION
(which is strongly NP-complete [115, Section 4.2.2]).
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recover w¯ when the measurement vectors are chosen in a very particular way from the unit circle
and the measurement errors are uniformly bounded.
Contributions. We make progress on both computational and statistical aspects of the problem.
1. We give an approximation algorithm for the least squares problem from (4.16) that, any
given (xi)ni=1, (yi)
n
i=1, and ε ∈ (0, 1), returns a solution with objective value at most 1 + ε
times that of the minimum in time (n/ε)O(d). This a fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme for any constant dimension.
2. We give an algorithm that exactly recovers w¯ in the measurement model from (4.15), un-
der the assumption that there are no measurement errors and the covariates (xi)ni=1 are
i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id). The algorithm, which is based on a reduction to a lattice problem
and employs the lattice basis reduction algorithm of [98], runs in poly(n, d) time when the
covariate vectors (xi)ni=1 and target vector w¯ are appropriately quantized. This result may
also be regarded as for each-type guarantee for exactly recovering a fixed vector w¯, which
complements the for all-type results of [112] concerning the number of measurement vectors
needed for recovering all possible vectors.
3. We show that in the measurement model from (4.15) where the measurement errors are
i.i.d. draws from N(0, σ2) and the covariate vectors are i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id), then no
algorithm can approximately recover w¯ unless SNR ≥ C min {1, d/ log log(n)} for some
absolute constant C > 0. We also show that when the covariate vectors are i.i.d. draws from
the uniform distribution on [−1/2, 1/2]d, then approximate recovery is impossible unless
SNR ≥ C ′ for some other absolute constant C ′ > 0.
Our algorithms are not meant for practical deployment, but instead are intended to shed light on
the computational difficulty of the least squares problem and the average-case recovery problem.
Indeed, note that a naïve brute-force search over permutations requires time Ω(n!) = nΩ(n), and
the only other previous algorithms (already discussed above) were restricted to d = 1 [113] or
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only had some form of approximation guarantee when d = 2 [116]. We are not aware of previous
algorithms for the average-case problem in general dimension d.4
Our lower bounds on SNR stand in contrast to what is achievable in the classical linear re-
gression model (where the covariate/response correspondence is known): in that model, the SNR
requirement for approximately recovering w¯ scales as d/n, and hence the problem becomes easier
with n. The lack of correspondence thus drastically changes the difficulty of the problem.
4.3.a Approximation algorithm for the least squares problem
In this section, we consider the least squares problem from Equation (4.16). The inputs are an
arbitrary matrix X = [x1|x2| · · · |xn]> ∈ Rn×d and an arbitrary vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)> ∈
R
n, and the goal is to find a vector w ∈ Rd and permutation matrix Π ∈ Pn (where Pn denotes
the space of n× n permutation matrices5) to minimize ‖Xw −Π>y‖22. This problem is NP-hard
in the case where d = Ω(n) [113] (see also Section 4.3.d). We give an approximation scheme
that, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), returns a (1 + ε)-approximation in time (n/ε)O(k) + poly(n, d), where
k := rank(X) ≤ min{n, d}.
We assume without loss of generality thatX ∈ Rn×k andX>X = Ik. This is because we can
always replace X with its matrix of left singular vectors U ∈ Rn×k, obtained via singular value
decomposition X = UΣV >, where U>U = V >V = Ik and Σ  0 is diagonal. A solution
(w,Π) for (U ,y) has the same cost as the solution (V Σ−1w,Π) for (X,y), and a solution
(w,Π) for (X,y) has the same cost as the solution (ΣV >w,Π) for (U ,y).
Algorithm
Our approximation algorithm, shown as Algorithm 3, uses a careful enumeration to beat the
naïve brute-force running time of Ω(|Pn|) = Ω(n!). It uses as a subroutine a “Row Sampling”
algorithm of [118] (described in Section 4.3.e), which has the following property.
4A recent algorithm of [117] exploits a similar average-case setting but only for a somewhat easier variant of the
problem where more information about the unknown correspondence is provided.
5Each permutation matrixΠ ∈ Pn corresponds to a permutation pi on [n]; the (i, j)-th entry ofΠ is one if pi(i) = j
and is zero otherwise.
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Algorithm 3 Approximation algorithm for least squares problem
input Covariate matrix X = [x1|x2| · · · |xn]> ∈ Rn×k; response vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)> ∈
R
n; approximation parameter ε ∈ (0, 1).
assume X>X = Ik.
output Weight vector ŵ ∈ Rk and permutation matrix Π̂ ∈ Pn.
1: Run “Row Sampling” algorithm with input matrix X to obtain a matrix S ∈ Rr×n with
r = 4k.
2: Let B be the set of vectors b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn)> ∈ Rn satisfying the following: for each
i ∈ [n],
• if the i-th column of S is all zeros, then bi = 0;
• otherwise, bi ∈ {y1, y2, . . . , yn}.
3: Let c := 1 + 4(1 +
√
n/(4k))2.
4: for each b ∈ B do
5: Compute w˜b ∈ arg minw∈Rk ‖S(Xw − b)‖22, and let rb := minΠ∈Pn ‖Xw˜b −Π>y‖22.
6: Construct a
√
εrb/c-netNb for the Euclidean ball of radius√crb around w˜b, so that for each
v ∈ Rk with ‖v − w˜b‖2 ≤
√




8: return ŵ ∈ arg min
w∈⋃b∈BNb minΠ∈Pn ‖Xw −Π
>y‖22 and Π̂ ∈ arg min
Π∈Pn
‖Xŵ −Π>y‖22.
Theorem 18 (Specialization of Theorem 12 in [118]). There is an algorithm (“Row Sampling”)
that, given any matrix A ∈ Rn×k with n ≥ k, returns in poly(n, k) time a matrix S ∈ Rr×n with
r = 4k such that the following hold.
1. Every row of S has at most one non-zero entry.
2. For every b ∈ Rn, every w′ ∈ arg minw∈Rk ‖S(Aw − b)‖22 satisfies ‖Aw′ − b‖22 ≤ c ·
minw∈Rk ‖Aw − b‖22 for c = 1 + 4(1 +
√
n/(4k))2 = O(n/k).
The matrix S returned by Row Sampling determines a (weighted) subset of O(k) rows of A
such that solving a (ordinary) least squares problem (with any right-hand side b) on this subset of
rows and corresponding right-hand side entries yields aO(n/k)-approximation to the least squares
problem over all rows and right-hand side entries. Row Sampling does not directly apply to our
problem because (1) it does not minimize over permutations of the right-hand side, and (2) the
approximation factor is too large. However, we are able to use it to narrow the search space in our
problem.
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An alternative to Row Sampling is to simply enumerate all subsets of k rows of X . This
is justified by a recent result of [119], which shows that for any right-hand side b ∈ Rn, using
“volume sampling” [120] to choose a matrix S ∈ {0, 1}k×k (where each row has one non-zero
entry) gives a similar guarantee as that of Row Sampling, except with the O(n/k) factor replaced
by k + 1 in expectation.
Analysis
The approximation guarantee of Algorithm 3 is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 19. Algorithm 3 returns ŵ ∈ Rk and Π̂ ∈ Pn satisfying
∥∥∥Xŵ − Π̂>y∥∥∥2
2





Proof. Let opt := minw,Π ‖Xw −Π>y‖22 be the optimal cost, and let (w?,Π?) denote a solution
achieving this cost. The optimality implies that w? satisfies the normal equations X>Xw? =
X>Π>?y. Observe that there exists a vector b? ∈ B satisfying Sb? = SΠ>?y. By Theorem 18 and
the normal equations, the vector w˜b? and cost value rb? satisfy
opt ≤ rb? ≤
∥∥Xw˜b? −Π>?y∥∥22 = ∥∥X(w˜b? −w?)∥∥22 + opt ≤ c · opt .
Moreover, since X>X = Ik, we have that ‖w˜b? −w?‖2 ≤
√
(c− 1)opt ≤ √crb? . By construc-
tion of Nb? , there exists w ∈ Nb? satisfying ‖w −w?‖22 = ‖X(w −w?)‖22 ≤ εrb?/c ≤ εopt.
For this w, the normal equations imply
min
Π∈Pn
‖Xw −Π>y‖22 ≤ ‖Xw −Π>?y‖22 = ‖X(w −w?)‖22 + opt ≤ (1 + ε)opt .
Therefore, the solution returned by Algorithm 3 has cost no more than (1 + ε)opt.
By the results of [113] for maximum likelihood estimation, our algorithm enjoys recovery guar-
antees for w¯ and p¯i when the data come from the Gaussian measurement model (4.15). However,
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the approximation guarantee also holds for worst-case inputs without generative assumptions.
Running time. We now consider the running time of Algorithm 3. There is the initial cost for
singular value decomposition (as discussed at the beginning of the section), and also for “Row
Sampling”; both of these take poly(n, d) time. For the rest of the algorithm, we need to consider
the size of B and the size of the net Nb for each b ∈ B. First, we have |B| ≤ nr = nO(k),
since S has only 4k rows and each row has at most a single non-zero entry. Next, for each b ∈
B, we construct the δ-net Nb (for δ :=
√
εrb/c) by constructing a δ/
√
k-net for the `∞-ball
of radius
√
crb centered at w˜b (using an appropriate axis-aligned grid). This has size |Nb| ≤
(4c2k/ε)k/2 = (n/ε)O(k). Finally, each arg minw∈Rk computation takes O(nk2) time, and each
(arg) minΠ∈Pn takes O(nk + n log n) time [113] (also see Section 4.3.e). So, the overall running
time is (n/ε)O(k) + poly(n, d).
4.3.b Exact recovery algorithm in noiseless Gaussian setting
To counter the intractability of the least squares problem in (4.16) confronted in Section 4.3.a,
it is natural to explore distributional assumptions that may lead to faster algorithms. In this section,
we consider the noiseless measurement model where the (xi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id) (as
in [113]). We give an algorithm that exactly recovers w¯ with high probability when n ≥ d + 1.
The algorithm runs in poly(n, d)-time when (xi)ni=1 and w¯ are appropriately quantized.
It will be notationally simpler to consider n+ 1 covariate vectors and responses
yi = w¯
>xp¯i(i) , i = 0, 1, . . . , n . (4.17)
Here, (xi)ni=0 are n+1 i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id), the unknown permutation p¯i is over {0, 1, . . . , n},
and the requirement of at least d+ 1 measurements is expressed as n ≥ d.
In fact, we shall consider a variant of the problem in which we are given one of the values of the
unknown permutation p¯i. Without loss of generality, assume we are given that p¯i(0) = 0. Solving
this variant of the problem suffices because there are only n + 1 possible values of p¯i(0): we can
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Algorithm 4 Find permutation
input Covariate vectors x0,x1,x2, . . . ,xn in Rd; response values y0, y1, y2, . . . , yn in R; confi-
dence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1); lattice parameter β > 0.
assume there exists w¯ ∈ Rd and permutation p¯i on [n] such that yi = w¯>xp¯i(i) for each i ∈ [n],
and that y0 = w¯>x0.
output Permutation pi on [n] or failure.
1: LetX = [x1|x2| · · · |xn]> ∈ Rn×d, and its pseudoinverse beX† = [x˜1|x˜2| · · · |x˜n].
2: Create Subset Sum instance with n2 source numbers ci,j := yix˜>j x0 for (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n] and
target sum y0.
3: Run Algorithm 5 with Subset Sum instance and lattice parameter β.
4: if Algorithm 5 returns a solution S ⊆ [n]× [n] then




try them all, incurring just a factor n+ 1 in the computation time. So henceforth, we just consider
p¯i as an unknown permutation on [n].
Algorithm
Our algorithm, shown as Algorithm 4, is based on a reduction to the Subset Sum problem. An
instance of Subset Sum is specified by an unordered collection of source numbers {ci}i∈I ⊂ R,
and a target sum t ∈ R. The goal is to find a subset S ⊆ I such that ∑i∈S ci = t. Although
Subset Sum is NP-hard in the worst case, it is tractable for certain structured instances [99, 121].
We prove that Algorithm 4 constructs such an instance with high probability. A similar algorithm
based on such a reduction was recently used by [122] for a different but related problem.
Algorithm 4 proceeds by (i) solving a Subset Sum instance based on the covariate vectors and
response values (using Algorithm 5), and (ii) constructing a permutation pi on [n] based on the
solution to the Subset Sum instance. With the permutation pi in hand, we (try to) find a solution
w ∈ Rd to the system of linear equations yi = w>xpi(i) for i ∈ [n]. If pi = p¯i, then there is a unique
such solution almost surely.
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Algorithm 5 [99] subset sum algorithm
input Source numbers {ci}i∈I ⊂ R; target sum t ∈ R; lattice parameter β > 0.
output Subset Ŝ ⊆ I or failure.




βt −βci : i ∈ I
]
∈ R(|I|+2)×(|I|+1) .
2: Run basis reduction [e.g., 98] to find non-zero lattice vector v of length at most 2|I|/2 · λ1(B).
3: if v = z(1,χ>Ŝ , 0)







The following theorem is the main recovery guarantee for Algorithm 4.
Theorem 20. Pick any δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose (xi)ni=0 are i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id), and (y0)ni=1
follow the noiseless measurement model from (4.17) for some w¯ ∈ Rd and permutation p¯i on [n]
(and p¯i(0) = 0), and that n ≥ d. Furthermore, suppose Algorithm 4 is run with inputs (xi)ni=0,
(yi)
n
i=0, δ, and β, and also that β ≥ 2n2/ε where ε is defined in Equation (4.22). With probability
at least 1− δ, Algorithm 4 returns pi = p¯i.
Remark 21. The value of ε from Equation (4.22) is directly proportional to‖w¯‖2, and Algorithm 4
requires a lower bound on ε (in the setting of the lattice parameter β). Hence, it suffices to deter-
mine a lower bound on‖w¯‖2. Such a bound can be obtained from the measurement values: a stan-





is a lower bound on ‖w¯‖2, and is within a constant factor of it as well.
Remark 22. Algorithm 4 strongly exploits the assumption of noiseless measurements, which is
expected given the SNR lower bounds of [113] for recovering p¯i. The algorithm, however, is also
very brittle and very likely fails in the presence of noise.
Remark 23. The recovery result does not contradict the results of [112], which show that a col-
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lection of 2d measurement vectors are necessary for recovering all w¯, even in the noiseless mea-
surement model of (4.17). Indeed, our result shows that for a fixed w¯ ∈ Rd, with high probability
d + 1 measurements in the model of (4.17) suffice to permit exactly recovery of w¯, but this same
set of measurement vectors (when d+ 1 < 2d) will fail for some other w¯′.
The proof of Theorem 20 is based on the following theorem—essentially due to [99] and
[121]—concerning certain structured instances of Subset Sum that can be solved using the lat-





zibi : z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ Z
 ⊂ Rm ,
this algorithm can be used to find a non-zero vector v ∈ L(B) \ {0} whose length is at most




Theorem 24 ([99, 121]). Suppose the Subset Sum instance specified by source numbers {ci}i∈I ⊂
R and target sum t ∈ R satisfy the following properties.
1. There is a subset S? ⊆ I such that∑i∈S? ci = t.
2. Define R := 2|I|/2
√|S?|+ 1 and ZR := {(z0, z) ∈ Z× ZI : 0 < z20 +∑i∈I z2i ≤ R2}.
There exists ε > 0 such that |z0 · t−
∑
i∈I zi · ci| ≥ ε for each (z0, z) ∈ ZR that is not
an integer multiple of (1,χ?), where χ? ∈ {0, 1}I is the characteristic vector for S?.
LetB be the lattice basisB constructed by Algorithm 5, and assume β ≥ 2|I|/2/ε. Then every non-
zero vector in the lattice Λ(B) with length at most 2|I|/2 times the length of the shortest non-zero
vector in Λ(B) is an integer multiple of the vector (1,χS? , 0), and the basis reduction algorithm
of [98] returns such a non-zero vector.
The Subset Sum instance in Algorithm 4 has n2 source numbers {ci,j : (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n]} and
target sum y0. We need to show that it satisfies the two conditions of Theorem 24.
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Let Sp¯i := {(i, j) : p¯i(i) = j} ⊂ [n]×[n], and let Π¯ = (Π¯i,j)(i,j)∈[n]×[n] ∈ Pn be the permutation
matrix with Π¯i,j := 1p¯i(i) = j for all (i, j) ∈ [n] × [n]. Note that Π¯ is the “characteristic vector”











A crude bound shows that|ZR| ≤ 2O(n4).
The following lemma establishes the first required property in Theorem 24.
Lemma 4.3.1. The random matrix X has rank d almost surely, and the subset Sp¯i satisfies y0 =∑
(i,j)∈Sp¯i ci,j .
Proof. That X has rank d almost surely follows from the fact that the probability density of X is













x>0 x˜j · yi · 1p¯i(i) = j =
∑
1≤i,j≤n
ci,j · 1p¯i(i) = j .
The next lemma establishes the second required property in Theorem 24. Here, we use the
fact that the Frobenius norm
∥∥z0Π¯−Z∥∥F is at least one whenever (z0,Z) ∈ Z × Zn×n is not an
integer multiple of (1, Π¯).
Lemma 4.3.2. Pick any η, η′ > 0 such that 3|ZR| η+η′ < 1. With probability at least 1−3|ZR| η−
η′, every (z0,Z) ∈ ZR with Z = (Zi,j)(i,j)∈[n]×[n] satisfies
∣∣∣∣∣z0 · y0 −∑
i,j
Zi,j · ci,j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ (pi/4) ·
√






)2 ·∥∥z0Π¯−Z∥∥F ·‖w¯‖2 .
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.1, the matrix Π¯ satisfies y0 =
∑
i,j Π¯i,j · ci,j . Fix any (z0,Z) ∈ ZR with
Z = (Zi,j)(i,j)∈[n]×[n]. Then
z0 · y0 −
∑
i,j
Zi,j · ci,j =
∑
i,j
(z0 · Π¯i,j − Zi,j) · x>0 x˜j · w¯>xp¯i(i) .
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Using matrix and vector notations, this can be written compactly as the inner productx>0 (X
†(z0Π¯−
Z)>Π¯Xw¯). Since x0 ∼ N(0, Id) and is independent of X , the distribution of the inner prod-
uct is normal with mean zero and standard deviation equal to ‖X†(z0Π¯−Z)>Π¯Xw¯‖2. By
Lemma 4.3.8 (in Section 4.3.f), with probability at least 1− η,
∣∣x>0 (X†(z0Π¯−Z)>Π¯Xw¯)∣∣ ≥ ‖X†(z0Π¯−Z)>Π¯Xw¯‖2 ·√pi2 · η . (4.18)





















· η1+1/(d−1) . (4.21)
Since Π¯ is orthogonal, we have that ‖(z0Π¯−Z)>Π¯‖F = ‖z0Π¯−Z‖F . Combining this with
(4.18), (4.19), (4.20), and (4.21), and union bounds over all (z0,Z) ∈ ZR proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 20. Lemma 4.3.1 and Lemma 4.3.2 (with η′ := δ/2 and η := δ/(6|ZR|)) to-
gether imply that with probability at least 1− δ, the source numbers {ci,j : (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n]} and
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target sum y0 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 24 with










)2 ·‖w¯‖2 ≥ 2−poly(n, log(1/δ)) ·‖w¯‖2 .
(4.22)
Thus, in this event, Algorithm 5 (with β satisfying β ≥ 2n2/2/ε) returns Ŝ = S?, which uniquely
determines the permutation pi = p¯i returned by Algorithm 4.
Running time. The basis reduction algorithm of [98] is iterative, with each iteration primarily
consisting of Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization and another efficient linear algebraic process called









In our case, k = n2 and λ1(B) =
√
n+ 1; and by Lemma 4.3.11 (in Section 4.3.f), each of the
basis vectors constructed has squared length at most 1 + β2 · poly(d, log(n), 1/δ) ·‖w¯‖22. Using
the tight setting of β required in Theorem 20, this gives a poly(n, d, log(1/δ)) bound on the total
number of iterations as well as on the total running time.
However, the basis reduction algorithm requires both arithmetic and rounding operations, which
are typically only available for finite precision rational inputs. Therefore, a formal running time
analysis would require the idealized real-valued covariate vectors (xi)ni=0 and unknown target vec-
tor w¯ to be quantized to finite precision values. This is doable, and is similar to using a discretized
Gaussian distribution for the distribution of the covariate vectors (and assuming w¯ is a vector of fi-
nite precision values), but leads to a messier analysis incomparable to the setup of previous works.
Nevertheless, it would be desirable to find a different algorithm that avoids lattice basis reduction
that still works with just d+ 1 measurements.
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4.3.c Lower bounds on signal-to-noise for approximate recovery
In this section, we consider the measurement model from (4.15) where (xi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws
from either N(0, Id) or the uniform distribution on [−1/2, 1/2]d, and (εi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from





required by any estimator ŵ = ŵ((xi)ni=1, (yi)
n
i=1) for w¯ to approximately recover w¯ in expecta-
tion. The estimators may have a priori knowledge of the values of‖w¯‖2 and σ2.
Theorem 25. Assume (εi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from N(0, σ2).
1. There is an absolute constant C > 0 such that the following holds. If n ≥ 3, d ≥ 22, (xi)ni=1
are i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id), (yi)ni=1 follow the measurement model from (4.15), and







then for any estimator ŵ, there exists some w¯ ∈ Rd such that
E
[‖ŵ − w¯‖2] ≥ 124‖w¯‖2 .
2. If (xi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from the uniform distribution on [−1/2, 1/2]d, and (yi)ni=1 follow
the measurement model from (4.15), and
SNR ≤ 2 ,
then for any estimator ŵ, there exists some w¯ ∈ Rd such that
E







Note that in the classical linear regression model where yi = w¯>xi + εi for i ∈ [n], the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator ŵmle satisfies E‖ŵmle − w¯‖2 ≤ Cσ
√
d/n, where C > 0 is an absolute
constant. Therefore, the SNR requirement to approximately recover w¯ up to (say) Euclidean dis-
tance‖w¯‖2 /24 is SNR ≥ 242Cd/n. Compared to this setting, Theorem 25 implies that with the
measurement model of (4.15), the SNR requirement (as a function of n) is at substantially higher
(d/ log log(n) in the normal covariate case, or a constant not even decreasing with n in the uniform
covariate case).
For the normal covariate case, [113] show that if n > d, ε <
√
n, and
SNR ≥ nc· nn−d+ε ,
then the maximum likelihood estimator (ŵmle, pimle) (i.e., any minimizer of (4.16)) satisfies pimle =
p¯i with probability at least 1 − c′n−2ε. (Here, c > 0 and c′ > 0 are absolute constants.) It is
straightforward to see that, on the same event, we have‖ŵmle − w¯‖2 ≤ Cσ
√
d/n for some abso-
lute constant C > 0. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient conditions on SNR for approximate
recovery of w¯ lie betweenC ′d/ log log(n) and nC′′ (for absolute constantsC ′, C ′′ > 0). Narrowing
this range remains an interesting open problem.
A sketch of the proof in the normal covariate case is as follows. Without loss of generality, we
restrict attention to the case where w¯ is a unit vector. We construct a 1/
√
2-packing of the unit
sphere in Rd; the target w¯ will be chosen from from this set. Observe that for any distinct u,u′ ∈





′)ni=1 is an i.i.d. sample from N(0, 1) of size n; we prove that they
therefore determine empirical distributions that are close to each other in Wasserstein-2 distance
with high probability. We then prove that conditional on this event, the resulting distributions of
(yi)
n
i=1 under x¯ = u and x¯ = u
′ (for any pair u,u′ ∈ U ) are close in Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Hence, by (a generalization of) Fano’s inequality [see, e.g., 123], no estimator can determine the
correct u ∈ U with high probability.
The proof for the uniform case is similar, using U = {e1,−e1} where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)>. The
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full proof of Theorem 25 is given in Section 4.3.g.
4.3.d Strong NP-hardness of the least squares problem
For a vector b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) and a permutation pi on [n], let bpi := (bpi(1), bpi(2), . . . , bpi(n))>.
Recall that in the 3-PARTITION problem, the input is d = 3k integers z1, z2, . . . , zd ∈ Z that
sum to Ck and satisfy C/4 < zi < C/2 for all i ∈ [d], and the problem is to decide if there is a
partition of [d] into k subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sk ⊆ [d] such that |Sj| = 3 and
∑
i∈Sj zi = C for each
j ∈ [k]. 3-PARTITION is NP-complete in the strong sense of [115, Section 4.2.2].
The PERMUTED LINEAR SYSTEM problem (also considered by [113]) is defined as follows.
The input is a matrix A ∈ Zn×d, and a vector b ∈ Qn. The problem is to decide if there exist a
vector x ∈ Qd and a permutation pi on [n] such thatAx = bpi.
Proposition 4.3.3. PERMUTED LINEAR SYSTEM is strongly NP-complete.
Because PERMUTED LINEAR SYSTEM is equivalent to deciding if the optimal value of the
least squares problem from (4.16) is zero, Lemma 4.3.3 implies that the least squares problem
from (4.16) is strongly NP-hard.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.3. It is clear that PERMUTED LINEAR SYSTEM is in NP. We give an efficient
reduction from 3-PARTITION to PERMUTED LINEAR SYSTEM. Given an instance z1, z2, . . . , zd
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The system of equationsAx = bpi has a solution if and only if
bpi(3j−2) + bpi(3j−1) + bpi(3j) = C , j ∈ [k] .
Any permutation pi on [n] satisfying these equations must satisfy the following two properties:
1. pi([d]) = [d].
This holds because for i > d, we have bi = C, and adding such bi to any other bi′ and bi′′
gives a sum larger than C.
2. zpi(3j−2) + zpi(3j−1) + zpi(3j) = C for each j ∈ [k].
This holds because since bi = zi for i ∈ [d].
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Any permutation pi on [n] with the two properties shown above gives k subsets Sj = {pi(3j −
2), pi(3j − 1), pi(3j)} for j ∈ [k] such that∑i∈Sj zi = C.
4.3.e Additional details for approximation algorithm
This section provides some additional details on subroutines used in Algorithm 3.
Row sampling. First, we give the details of the “Row Sampling” algorithm of [118] used in
Section 4.3.a. The pseudocode is presented as Algorithm 6, and uses the following notations:
• For each i ∈ [n], ei is the i-th coordinate basis vector in Rn.
• L(x, δL,A, `) :=
x>(A− (`+ δL)Ik)−2x








i=1 are the eigenvalues ofA.
• Û(x, δ,B, u) :=
x>(B − u′Ir)−2x
φ′(u,B)− φ′(u′,B) − x
>(B − u′Ir)−1x ,






i=1 are the eigenvalues ofB.
Algorithm 6 “Row Sampling” algorithm of [118]
input MatrixX = [x1|x2| · · · |xn]> ∈ Rn×k such thatX>X = Ik; integer r ≥ k.
output Matrix S = (Si,j)(i,j)∈[r]×[n] ∈ Rr×n.
1: SetA0 = 0k×k,B0 = 0n×n, S = 0r×n, δ = (1 + n/r)(1−
√
k/r)−1 and δL = 1.
2: for τ = 0 to r − 1 do
3: Let `τ = τ −
√
rk and uτ = δ(τ +
√
nr).
4: Select iτ ∈ [n] and number tτ > 0 such that Û(eiτ , δ,Bτ , uτ ) ≤ 1tτ ≤ L(xiτ , δL,Aτ , `τ ).
5: SetAτ+1 = Aτ + tτxiτx>iτ ,Bτ+1 = Bτ + tτeiτe
>





One may also consider using levarage score sampling (i.e., sample a row of X proportional to
its squared length) instead of this Row Sampling algorithm. This would work, but would require
selecting O(k log k) rows as opposed to just O(k) [124]; this leads to an overall running time of






subsets of k rows of X . This is slower than Algorithm 6 but yields a better
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approximation guarantee (specifically, the factor c from Theorem 18 can be replaced by k + 1
on account of a result of [119]). However, the overall approximation guarantee and asymptotic
running time of Algorithm 3 is the same.






for any given a, b ∈ Rn. Let (a(i))ni=1 denote the non-decreasing ordering a(1) ≤ a(2) ≤ · · · ≤ a(n)












Hence, if Πa (respectively, Πb) is the permutation matrix that rearranges the entires of a (respec-







∥∥Πaa−Πbb∥∥22 = ∥∥Π>a (Πaa−Πbb)∥∥22 = ∥∥a−Π>aΠbb∥∥22 ,
where the second and third equalities use the fact that permutation matrices are orthogonal. Thus,
the minimizing permutation matrix is Π = Π>bΠa. This can be found by sorting the entries of a
and of b in O(n log n) time.
4.3.f Probability inequalities
This section collects several probability inequalities used in the analysis of Algorithm 4. Let
σi(M ) denote the i-th largest singular value of the matrixM .
Extreme singular values of Gaussian random matrices.
Lemma 4.3.4 (Eq. 3.2 in [125]). LetA be an n× d matrix whose entries are i.i.d. N(0, 1) random
116







Lemma 4.3.5 (Theorem II.13 in [110]). Let A be an n× d matrix whose entries are i.i.d. N(0, 1)












Tail bounds for Gaussian and χ2 random variables.
Lemma 4.3.6. Let Z ∼ N(0, 1). For any η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(Z2 ≥ 2 ln(2/δ)) ≤ η.
Proof. This follows from the standard Chernoff bounding method.
Lemma 4.3.7 (Lemma 1 in [126]). Let W ∼ χ2k. For any η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(W ≥ k+2
√
k ln(1/η)+
2 ln(1/η)) ≤ η.
Anti-concentration bounds for Gaussian and χ2 random variables.
Lemma 4.3.8. Let Z ∼ N(0, 1). For any η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(Z2 ≤ piη2/2) ≤ η.
Proof. This follows from direct integration.
Lemma 4.3.9 (Lemma 9 in [113]). Let W ∼ χ2k. For any η ∈ (0, 1), Pr(W ≤ kη2/k/4) ≤ η.
Lemma 4.3.10. Let x ∈ Rd be any vector, M ∈ Rn×n be any matrix, and A a random n × d
matrix of i.i.d. N(0, 1) random variables. For any η ∈ (0, 1/2),
Pr
(







Proof. Let u1 := x/‖x‖2, and extend to an orthonormal basis u1,u2, . . . ,ud for Rd. Let gi :=
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Aui for each i ∈ [d], so g1, g2, . . . , gd are i.i.d. N(0, In) random vectors. We first show that
Pr
(






≤ η . (4.23)
To see this, note that the distribution of‖Mg1‖22 is the same as that of
∑n
i=1 σi(M)
2 · Z2i , where
Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn are i.i.d. N(0, 1) random variables. Therefore, Lemma 4.3.8 and the fact‖M‖22 ≥
‖M‖2F /n proves the claim in (4.23).
Next, observe that

























Conditional on g1, the final right-hand side in (4.24) has the same distribution as‖x‖22·‖Mg1‖22·W ,











Combining this inequality with the inequality from (4.23) and a union bound proves the claim.
Lattice basis size. The following lemma is used to bound the size of the lattice basis vectors
constructed by Algorithm 4 (via Algorithm 5). Recall that there are n2 + 1 basis vectors; one has
length
√
1 + β2y20 , and the remaining n
2 have length
√
1 + β2c2i,j for (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n].
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Lemma 4.3.11. For any η ∈ (0, 1/5), with probability at least 1− 5η,
|y0| ≤ ‖w¯‖2
√




d ln(n/η) + 2 ln(n/η) ·
√
2 ln(2n/η)
where (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n].











2 ln(2n/η) , i ∈ [n] ,
|x˜>j x0| ≤ ‖x˜j‖2
√





d ln(n/η) + 2 ln(n/η) , j ∈ [n] .
In this event, we have for each (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n],
∣∣ci,j∣∣ = |x>p¯i(i)w¯| · |x˜>j x0|
≤ ‖w¯‖2 ·
√
















d ln(n/η) + 2 ln(n/η) ·
√
2 ln(2n/η) ,
and |y0| ≤ ‖w¯‖2
√
2 ln(2/η).
4.3.g Proof of signal-to-noise lower bounds
This section provides the proof of Theorem 25.
Below, for any vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an)>, we use the notation (a(i))ni=1 to denote the non-
decreasing ordering a(1) ≤ a(2) ≤ · · · ≤ a(n) of its entries, and (a)↑ := (a(1), a(2), . . . , a(n))> to
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denote the vector of the entries in this order.
We use the following representation for the Kantorovich transport distance with respect to
Euclidean metric (i.e., Wasserstein-2 distance, denoted by W2).
Lemma 4.3.12 (Lemma 4.1 in [127]). Let µn be the empirical measure on a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ R, and












(a(i) − b(i))2 ,
where minpi denotes minimization over permutations pi on [n].
For probability measures µ and ν, we use KL(µ, ν) to denote the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between µ and ν, and‖µ− ν‖tv to denote the total variation distance between µ and ν.
Since p¯i is unknown in the measurement model from (4.15), we may assume that y1, y2, . . . , yn
are provided as an unordered multiset, denoted by {yi}ni=1. In fact, we shall use the following
equivalent generative process:
1. Draw (xi)ni=1 i.i.d. from either N(0, Id) (in Section 4.3.g) or the uniform distribution on
[−1/2, 1/2]d (in Section 4.3.g), and independently, draw ε ∼ N(0, σ2In).
2. Set hw¯ := (w¯>x1, w¯>x2, . . . , w¯>xn)>.
3. Set y := h↑w¯ + ε.
It is clear that ((xi)ni=1, {yi}ni=1) has the same distribution under this model as under that from (4.15).
Normal case
We first consider the case where (xi)ni=1 are i.i.d. draws from N(0, Id). By homogeneity, we
may assume without loss of generality that‖w¯‖2 = 1, so SNR = 1/σ2.
The proof is based on the Generalized Fano method of [123] as described by [128].
Lemma 4.3.13 (Lemma 3 in [128]). Let (Θ, ρ) be a pseudometric space, and let Θ˜ ⊆ Θ index
a collection of probability measures (Pθ)θ∈Θ˜ such that ρ(θ, θ
′) ≥ α and KL(Pθ, Pθ) ≤ β for all
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where EPθ denotes expectation with respect to data drawn from Pθ.
We apply Lemma 4.3.13 with (Θ, ρ) = (Sd−1,‖·‖2). We construct a packing U of the unit
sphere Sd−1 := {u ∈ Rd :‖u‖2 = 1} using the following variant of the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Lemma 4.3.14 (Lemma 4.10 in [129]). For every h ∈ [d] such that h ≤ d/4, there exists a subset
C of {0, 1}d such that (i) the Hamming weight of each c ∈ C is h, (ii) the Hamming distance
between every distinct pair c, c′ ∈ C is more than h/2, and (iii) the cardinality of C satisfies
ln |C| ≥ 0.233h ln(d/h).





h : c ∈ C
}
⊂ Sd−1 .
Observe thatU is a (1/
√











For each u ∈ U , let Pu denote the probability distribution of ((xi)ni=1, {yi}ni=1) when w¯ = u.
Also, define Qu to be the corresponding conditional distribution of {yi}ni=1 given (xi)ni=1, and Q˜u
to be the corresponding conditional distribution of y given (xi)ni=1.
For any u,u′ ∈ U ,





by the data processing inequality for KL-divergence and the properties of the multivariate Gaus-
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for all distinct u,u′ ∈ U , where C0 > 0 is the absolute constant from Lemma 4.3.16 (below).
By Equation (4.25), Lemma 4.3.16, and a union bound, we have Pr(E) ≥ 1/2. Therefore, by










1− C0 log log(n) + 16 ln |U |












1− C0 log log(n)







Plugging in the lower bound for ln |U | and the upper bound on SNR = 1/σ2 completes the proof.
Uniform case
We now consider the case where (xi)ni=1 are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on
[−1/2, 1/2]d.6 Again, by homogeneity, we assume without loss of generality that‖w¯‖2 = 1, so
SNR = 1/σ2.
The proof is based on the two-point method of [130] as described by [128].
Lemma 4.3.15 (Lemma 1 in [128]). Let (Θ, ρ) be a pseudometric space, and let θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ
correspond to probability measures Pθ1 and Pθ2 on the same space. Then for any estimator θ̂













where EPθ denotes expectation with respect to data drawn from Pθ.
6We actually just need that the marginal distribution of the first coordinate of each xi be uniform on [−1/2, 1/2].
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We apply Lemma 4.3.15 with (Θ, ρ) = (Sd−1,‖·‖2). As before, we define for each u ∈
{e1,−e1}:
• Pu, the distribution of ((xi)ni=1, {yi}ni=1) when w¯ = u;
• Qu, the corresponding conditional distribution of {yi}ni=1 given (xi)ni=1;
• Q˜u, the corresponding conditional distribution of y given (xi)ni=1.
Let E be the event in which ∥∥∥h↑e1 − h↑−e1∥∥∥2
2
≤ 1 .
By Lemma 4.3.20 (below), Pr(E) ≥ 1/2. Moreover, since Pe1(E) = P−e1(E) = Pr(E),
‖Pe1 − P−e1‖tv ≤





















Above, the second inequality follows from Pinsker’s inequality; the third inequality uses (4.25)
and the fact ‖h↑e1 − h↑−e1‖
2
2
≤ 1 on the event E , the fourth inequality uses the assumption that























Lemma 4.3.16. There is an absolute constant C0 > 0 such that the following holds. Let n ≥ 3,
and let X be a random n × d matrix of i.i.d. N(0, 1) random variables. For any unit vectors
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The proof of Lemma 4.3.16 uses the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.17 (Corollary 6.14 in [127]). There is an absolute constant C > 0 such that the
following holds. If n ≥ 3, µ is the standard Gaussian measure on R, and µn is the empirical





] ≤ C log log(n)
n
.
Lemma 4.3.18 (Eq. 2.35 in [131]). Let Z ∼ N(0, Ip) be a standard normal random vector in Rp,
and f : Rp → R be L-Lipschitz with respect to the Euclidean metric. Then for any t > 0,
Pr
(
f(Z) ≥ E f(Z) + t) ≤ e−t2/(2L2) .
Proof of Lemma 4.3.16. Fix unit vectors u and u′. Observe that the entries of each of Xu and
Xu′ comprises an i.i.d. sample from N(0, 1) =: µ; let µn and νn denote the respective empirical





Then, by Lemma 4.3.12, the triangle inequality, Jensen’s inequality, and Lemma 4.3.17,
E f(X)√
n








Moreover, for anyA,A′ ∈ Rn×d,
f(A)− f(A′) ≤
















where the first two steps follow from the triangle inequality, the third step uses Lemma 4.3.12, and
‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. Therefore, f is 2-Lipschitz with respect to the Euclidean metric
on Rn×d. By Lemma 4.3.18, for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
(





Combining this with the upper bound on E f(X) completes the proof.
Lemma 4.3.19 (Eqs. 1.7.3 and 1.7.5 in [132]). LetX1, X2, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. draws from the uniform


























































































































if n is odd .
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